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THE WAR ON TERROR, LOCAL POLICE, AND 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: A CURIOUS TALE OF 
POLICE POWER IN POST-9/11 AMERICA
David A. Harris
In post-9/11 America, no goal ranks higher for law enforcement than preventing 
the next terrorist attack.  This is as true for local police departments as it is for the FBI, 
and police in cities.  At the same time, many advocates of tightening U.S. immigration 
enforcement have recast their efforts as national security and anti-terrorism campaigns.  
Thus, these advocates and their many allies in the current administration and in Congress 
have called for local police to become involved in enforcing immigration law.  Officials 
in both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government have taken a 
number of actions designed to make this happen, pushing expanded power and authority 
on law enforcement in order that these agencies take up the fight.
In the past, as national crises over crime have been declared – think, for example, 
of the war on drugs – state and local police have risen as one to enlist in the struggle, and 
have both fought for and accepted expanded authority to carry out their duties.  Thus it 
will surprise many to hear that, in this instance – with nothing less than the prevention of 
terrorist attacks at stake – local law enforcement has, for the most part, vehemently 
refused to accept the increased authority to enforce immigration law that the federal 
government has proffered.   
Various explanations have been tendered for this, but the one that rings truest by 
far is that police do not wish to become involved in immigration enforcement because 
doing so constitutes bad police work – that is, poor public safety policy.  Becoming 
adjunct soldiers to federal immigration enforcement agencies will actually make the 
public not safer, but less safe, from criminals and predators.  Ironically, it will also make 
Americans less safe from the dangers posed by terrorists.  The reasons for this have much 
to do with the building success and popularity of community policing among police 
officers over the last twenty years.  As police officers in departments of all sizes in every 
region of the U.S. know, making communities safe depends on intelligence gathering –
which in turn depends on the very types of relationships between the public and the 
police that community policing produces.
Thus the refusal of state and local law enforcement to become involved in 
immigration enforcement both illuminates a turning point in American policing, and 
teaches us important lessons in how we must go forward in the war on terror if we are to 
succeed.
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Another way to help during this period of transition is through state and 
local law enforcement…State and local law enforcement officials are an 
important part of our border security, and they need to be a part of our 
strategy to secure our borders.
President George W. Bush, addressing the nation on the 
subject of immigration, May 15, 2006
I.  INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in the deaths of almost three 
thousand people.  This was an act of war, but members of the law enforcement 
community and many others viewed the attacks as a massive crime – the largest act of 
mass murder in the history of our country.1  These acts will likely have significant and 
long-lasting impact on many aspects of our criminal justice system, particularly on what 
we expect law enforcement to do to keep us safe, and we have already witnessed some 
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 For example, Professor William Stuntz of Harvard Law School has described the attacks as a huge, one-
day crime wave.  William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2138 (2002).
3highly visible changes in policing.  For example, the attacks resulted in a change in the 
primary mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  For all of the prior years of its 
existence, the FBI pursued interstate criminals, white-collar offenders, bank robbers, and 
organized crime; since September of 2001, the Bureau has the front-line responsibility for 
the prevention of terrorist acts.2  In order to have the tools to carry out these tasks, the 
FBI has received new law enforcement powers.  The USA PATRIOT Act allows FBI 
agents to perform so-called “sneak and peek” searches,3 and to gather a limitless number 
of “business” records on anyone in the U.S. with nothing more than an application
presented to a judge.4 The Act also allows the FBI to obtain warrants for surveillance 
activities without meeting traditional Fourth Amendment standards as long as suspicion 
of foreign intelligence or terror-related activities is just one reason for the intrusion; it 
need not be the primary reason.5
But the effects of the 9/11 attacks on American law enforcement will reach far 
beyond the FBI.  State and local police departments – from state police and highway 
patrol agencies, to county sheriffs and the police departments of large cities and small 
towns – already feel the impact.  Elected officials and citizens will expect not just the FBI 
but these local police agencies to do anything necessary to stop terrorism on our soil.  
And while the FBI may have the more glamorous, leading role in these efforts – the 
surveillance and arrests of members of terrorist cells that make headlines across the 
country – local law enforcement may have to carry the bulk of the everyday anti-
2 Change of Mandate: 2001—Present, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/changeman.htm, visited February 17, 2006 (explaining how the 
terrorist attacks led directly to a change in the Bureau’s responsibilities, with primary emphasis on fighting 
terrorism and international counter-intelligence work).
3
 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. Law 107-56, Sec. 213 (2001)
4 Id. at Sec. 215.
5 Id. at Sec. 218
4terrorism work: guarding non-federal facilities, securing large public events, industrial 
sites, critical infrastructure, and the like.  Police must accomplish all of this while still 
carrying the responsibility for addressing garden-variety law enforcement.  In addition, 
they may also have to pick up the slack on crimes that federal law enforcement simply 
cannot pursue to the extent that they once did.
This is the brave new world for law enforcement in post-9/11 America: using 
police power to thwart terrorists has become a top priority for every police agency, 
federal, state, or local.   What with the enemies we face – terrorists who will seemingly 
do anything to harm us, and who want to kill us more than they themselves want to live –
and the scale of the harm these enemies can do with one well-planned attack, the risk 
involved in these attacks becomes so great that stopping them naturally becomes the 
public safety imperative – even if the risk to any one individual in the U.S. is actually 
quite small.  And much of this burden will fall to local police.  
Seasoned observers of law enforcement over the last thirty years would expect 
police agencies to try to meet these new challenges by seeking greater power and 
authority in order to accomplish this new mission.  Cases decided by U.S. courts dealing 
with police authority exhibit exactly this pattern over the past several decades.  When a 
new criminal justice mission becomes important to public officials and citizens – for 
example, the war on drugs in the 1980s and 1990s – police departments and prosecuting 
authorities seek greater power to take on the bad guys.  And this power usually takes the 
form of greater legal flexibility to deal with suspects, investigations, and evidence, with 
less post-hoc interference from courts. Given the risks and dangers involved in potential 
terrorism, it would shock no one if courts gave greater power to all of law enforcement, 
5including state and local police.  In fact, courts might find it difficult to do otherwise 
because the shadow of the attacks would lurk in the background of all of their decisions 
on the scope of police power;6 viewed in any fair way, our courts and other criminal 
justice institutions have often responded this way in the past.   Indeed, increasing police 
authority has become one of the essential features of anti-crime policy in the United 
States over the last several decades: law enforcement – not just police departments but 
prosecutors and the U.S. Department of Justice – seek greater power for police to use in 
the investigation of crime, in response to some perceived criminal justice crisis.  This 
often begins with the deployment of new tactics or technologies.  When the new tactics –
roadway checkpoints to detect drunk driving, for example7 – become contested issues in 
courts, law enforcement agencies and their allies fight hard to get judges to bless the new 
approaches.  Once approved, these new tactics come into wider use throughout law 
enforcement, and yet another new tactic at the next legal boundary line – for example, 
roadway checkpoints not to apprehend drunk drivers but to detect those carrying 
narcotics8 – undergoes the same cycle of use and constitutional testing in court.  The 
great run of cases in criminal procedure over the last twenty to thirty years shows this 
repeated pushing out against constitutional boundaries, and a resulting incremental (but 
steady) increase in law enforcement authority granted by courts to police over the years.  
Law enforcement and its allies seek greater police authority from the courts, usually 
receive the new power they seek, and then seek more in the next case.  Given the latest 
6
 William J. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 2140-2141; see also Steven G. Brandl, Back to the Future: The 
Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law Enforcement Practice and Policy, 1 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L 133, 
144 (Fall 2003) (with greater demands on police in the post-9/11 era, especially as regards global terrorism 
issues, law enforcement agencies will be given more authority).  One need not look hard to find evidence 
that Professor Stuntz was right.  See note 110 , infra, and accompanying text.  
7 Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
8 Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
6enforcement imperative – fighting terrorism – local police would likely seek, and receive, 
a considerable array of new power and discretion as soldiers in the war on terror.
But the story of state and local policing after September 11 breaks with this 
familiar pattern.  Local police will undoubtedly receive greater discretionary power in the 
post-9/11 world, and will use that power – not only in cases involving terrorism, but also 
in garden-variety criminal cases; this has actually begun to happen already.9  But in one 
very visible category of enforcement, local police departments have been offered greater 
authority in the war on terror – and for the most part, they have refused it.  
The enforcement of immigration law forms the context for this unusual set of 
events.  In the days since September 11, 2001, the federal government has repeatedly 
made extensive use of immigration law to investigate persons suspected of involvement 
with terrorism.10  All of the 19 hijackers involved in the attacks on that day came from 
outside the U.S.; all were young Muslim men from Middle Eastern countries.  Fifteen 
came from Saudi Arabia.  And al Qaeda, the group that planned and carried out the 
attacks, has its base and finds its members in the Middle East and South Asia.   With the 
focus on foreigners, the U.S. government found in immigration law a handy and powerful 
tool.  Many common violations of immigration law are civil, not criminal, in nature.11
9 E.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2003) (police may stop drivers without suspicion at checkpoint, 
which was at site of hit and run accident and held on same day of week and at same time of day, to attempt 
to gather information about accident).  Prosecutors have also begun using powers granted to them in the 
USA PATRIOT Act to conduct investigations other than those that involve terrorism.  See, e.g., Steve 
Friess, Patriot Act Gets Mixed Reviews in Vegas, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2003, at A 3 (use of Patriot Act 
to investigate finances of Las Vegas strip club in garden-variety corruption case unrelated to terrorism).
10
 For a comprehensive overview of how the federal government used immigration law as an anti-terrorism 
tool in the months immediately after September 11, 2001, see Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on 
Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, April 2003, 
accessed Feb. 21, 2006, at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm. 
11 See generally Steve H. Legomsky, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 1204 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining that 
as far as immigration violations, some are civil while a select group are criminal: “[I]n some instances 
7This means, of course, that certain constitutional and criminal procedure concepts do not 
apply in such cases.  Immigration law and regulations have also become incredibly 
complex, and understanding the system and the law often requires detailed knowledge 
and considerable experience.12  Additionally, when people have violated immigration 
law, the government has the power to detain them while it makes efforts to remove 
them.13  All of this makes immigration law an incredibly potent weapon, because it 
essentially gives the government the ability to incarcerate undocumented aliens14
preventively, without any proof of involvement in any criminal or terrorist action, and 
certainly without proof that might meet a criminal court’s probable cause standard.    
Immigration law is also quite easy to violate, because of its many technical 
requirements.15  And police can use immigration law this way even if they actually have 
an interest not in immigration, but in terrorism, of which they have scant or no evidence  
Congress has made the conduct a crime.  In others, Congress has chosen instead to make the conduct a civil 
offense and attach generally milder penalties.”).
12 Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 548 F.2d  37, 38 (2d. Cir. 1977) (putting the Immigration
and Nationality Act on par with the federal tax code for excruciating complexity).
13
 Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. 236, codified at 8 U.S.C. sec 1226 (a); see also Report of the 
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 10, at (“The INS has authority to arrest aliens if they are present 
in the United States in violation of immigration law. Aliens who were never lawfully admitted into the 
United States are labeled ‘inadmissible.’ Aliens who were lawfully admitted into the United States but 
failed to maintain their immigration status, overstayed their visa, or engaged in unlawful conduct are 
‘removable’ or ‘deportable.’”)  Removal proceedings take place under section 240 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537.
14
 There is, of course, on ongoing and robust controversy concerning how to properly refer to police who 
are in the U.S. in violation of immigration law.  Some use the term “illegal aliens,” e.g., Illegal 
Immigration and Public Health, report by Federation for American Immigration Reform, accessed at 
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters64bf, while others prefer the 
term “undocumented migrants,” e.g., Jeffrey S. Passel, Undocumented Migrants: Numbers and 
Characteristics, Pew Hispanic Center, June 14, 2005, accessed at 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=46.  The stakes in this discussion are not trivial; how 
one names something can have enormous impact upon how the public debate on the issue is framed.  See, 
e.g., Michele Norris, Speaking the Language of the Immigration Debate, All Things Considered, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO, April 6, 2006 (quoting Frank Luntz, communications advisor to Republican politicians, as 
saying, “Well, let’s be blunt, the words that you use to describe illegal immigration are the words that 
determine whether people support or oppose a whole variety of different issues.”).  But since the resolution 
of this debate is well beyond the scope of this article, I will use the term “undocumented alien,” simply as a 
way to split the proverbial baby.
15 See note 67 through 70, infra, and accompanying text.
8– in other words, even if immigration issues serve only as a pretext for the government’s 
interest in something else.  It was this power – the largely unfettered authority to use 
immigration law to stop, detain, question and lock up anyone with an immigration 
problem – that local police publicly declared they did not want. To be sure, the context in 
which local police refused this new power had unusual aspects.  A court would not confer 
this power and discretion; rather, it would come through legislation and regulation.  But 
given the magnitude of the risk of terrorism, and the size of the task of fighting it, turning 
away additional power is not something one would have expected police to do –
especially given the well-established, years-long pattern of continually seeking to enlarge 
their power.  But local law enforcement agencies were not just uninterested in becoming 
involved in this part of the federal government’s efforts against immigration; they were 
vehemently opposed to it.  Thus in the central law enforcement battle of our time, we see 
state and local police doing something curiously unusual – saying “no, thank you” to 
greater police power.
Grave shortfalls in available police resources and manpower no doubt account for 
some of this opposition.  Local police responsibilities have mushroomed, what with an 
avalanche of new homeland security duties, at the same time that state and local budgets 
have become leaner.16  And some of the resistance no doubt comes from a sincere, good 
faith conviction that enforcing immigration law remains a task uniquely appropriate for 
federal authorities and particularly unsuited for local police.17  But something more 
fundamental caused the opposition to these federal proposals.  Police work has changed 
in some basic ways over the last fifteen to twenty years in America.  To be sure, it has 
16 See notes 121 through 123, infra, and accompanying text.
17 See notes 124 through 127, infra, and accompanying text.
9changed neither widely nor deeply enough.  But with community policing, problem-
oriented policing and other new approaches to public safety becoming increasingly 
commonplace in law enforcement,18 police officers, police supervisors, and whole police 
departments had no difficulty recognizing a problem implicit in the federal efforts: 
getting local police involved in immigration enforcement would be just plain poor police 
work, because it would hurt the ability of police to fulfill their primary mission: fighting 
crime and assuring public safety.  Police departments that have adopted a community 
policing philosophy know that getting on the wrong side of the immigrant communities 
in their midst constitutes a basic mistake.  This is not an example of political correctness 
run amok, or of police officers mesmerized by cultural diversity training.  Rather, officers 
and departments using community policing know that they can only make their 
communities safe – from criminals, from terrorists, or any other threat – by working with
communities, and decidedly not by instilling the type of fear that working as adjunct 
immigration agents will create.  State and local law enforcement’s resistance to enforcing 
immigration law thus represents progress – both because it shows a new level of the 
awareness of what makes for good police work, and because it shows our police 
departments getting smarter about what they do, in the best sense of the word.  Perhaps 
police have begun to learn that having ever more power, with fewer legal limits, does not 
necessarily make for better, more successful, or more efficient law enforcement.  That is 
the possibility, and the promise, that this article will examine.
Part II of this article will discuss the risks in the post-9/11 era as we search for 
public safety, and the role of local police in that effort.  Part III examines immigration 
18
 For an introduction to these topics and some discussion of their widespread use today, see David A. 
Harris, GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING (2005). 
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law as a front in the anti-terrorism struggle, and the federal efforts to involve state and 
local police in immigration enforcement.  Part IV discusses the reaction of non-federal 
law enforcement to these efforts, and Part V attempts to draw lessons from this reaction.
II. THE POST 9/11 CONTEXT: THE RISKS PRESENTED BY TERRORISM, 
THE SUPREME COURT’S REACTION, AND THE NEW ROLES OF LOCAL 
POLICE
Terrorism did not, of course, arrive in the United States on September 11, 2001.   
This becomes obvious even when looking back only as far as the 1990s. The attacks on 
the World Trade Towers in September of 2001 were the second attempt, not the first, to 
destroy these buildings.  The first came in 1993, when terrorists struck the Towers with a 
truck bomb.19  The attacks resulted in five deaths and hundreds of injuries.20  And the 
deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history before September of 2001 came in 1995: Timothy 
McVeigh’s bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, which killed one hundred 
and sixty-seven people.21  Nevertheless, the attacks of September 11 surely marked a 
difference in scale and scope.  The nineteen al Qaeda terrorists turned full-size 
commercial airliners loaded with fuel and passengers into guided missiles, killing not 
tens or hundreds but thousands, 22 and destroying or (in the case of the Pentagon) badly 
damaging several of the most recognizable landmarks in the country.  Perhaps more to 
the point, the death, injury, and destruction of 9/11 seemed to require a re-assessment in 
19 Explosion at the World Trade Center: Death and Fear Rock a Landmark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at 
p. 21.  
20 Id. 
21 Roses in Remembrance at Oklahoma City, N. Y.  TIMES, May 10, 1995, at D 21 (describing tribute to 
167 victims).
22
 When Professor Stuntz of Harvard called September 11, 2001, a one-day crime wave, he points to the 
thousands of deaths as the cause of a twenty percent increase in the homicide rate for the year for the whole 
nation. William J. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 2138.
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the customary calculus of the risk of terrorism: Americans suddenly found their own 
country in danger of terrorist assaults of catastrophic dimensions.  Those types of attacks, 
so often thought of as something that happened only in other countries, had suddenly 
become real threats at home.  All at once, the possibility of terrorism resulting in massive 
casualties on American soil became very real.  
One consequence of this was that courts would likely do what they had done in 
the past in other crime crises: in their decisions, courts would interpret the Fourth 
Amendment in ways that would give police a greater amount of power in search and 
seizure matters.  This seemed inevitable, even in cases having nothing to do with 
terrorism; judges would invariably see everyday criminal justice issues through the lens 
of terrorism.23  For example, a judge deciding a case the use of police dogs, such as 
Illinois v. Caballes,24 would likely consider not just about the issue presented – under 
what circumstances police could use a dog to sniff for narcotics? – but also the use of 
dogs to detect explosives or other weapons.  Not wanting to rule in a way that might 
restrict police in the latter situation, courts would more likely give police more authority 
in the former.
Some of the criminal procedure cases decided by the Supreme Court after 9/11 
with only indirect anti-terrorism implications have proven this point.  Take  Caballes as 
just one example.  One can make a reasonable argument (as the Illinois Supreme Court 
did in its opinion25) that the way that the police used the drug-sniffing dog in Caballes
changed a simple traffic stop into a drug interdiction investigation, without any 
23 Id. at 2139-2140.
24
 543 U.S 405 (2005).
25 People v. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d 504, 820 N.E. 2d 202 (2003).  
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evidentiary basis.  But one needs very little imagination to see that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had in mind the use of dogs not just in drug interdiction, but in anti- terrorism work.  
At least one of the amicus briefs before the Court in Caballes made explicit the 
connection between the case and the use of dogs against terrorism, stating that any legal 
restriction on the use of police dogs “threatens to undermine the government’s war on 
terror, which relies on canines to sniff vehicles and luggage…”26 The post-9/11 coloring 
of the case becomes more obvious yet in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  Justice Ginsburg 
states her disagreement with the majority without equivocation: using a dog trained to 
detect narcotics in a run of the mill traffic offense case turns the encounter into an 
investigation of drug crime; therefore, police should have probable cause to walk the dog 
around the defendant’s car.27  But Justice Ginsburg carefully noted she would not feel the 
same way about a terrorism-related use of a trained dog.  “A dog sniff for explosives, 
involving security interests not presented here, would be an entirely different 
matter…The use of bomb-detection dogs to check vehicles for explosives” meets 
constitutional standards.28   In case anyone had missed her point, Justice Ginsburg quoted 
approvingly from Indianapolis v. Edmond: “the Fourth Amendment would almost 
certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist 
attack...”29
 In this same post-9/11 time frame, the situation of state and local police in the 
U.S. has changed dramatically.  The FBI has, of course, assumed the lead role in 
26 Illinois v. Caballes, , Brief for Amici Curiae Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and Major City 
Chiefs Association, Lexis 2003 U.S. Briefs 923 (2004).  
27 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 421-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28
 Id. at 423, 425 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, at 44.
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terrorism prevention and investigation,30 but state and local police agencies have also had 
to assume a vast number of new responsibilities.  A few of these new tasks deal directly 
with terrorism; most of these are not nearly as exotic as the new roles the FBI had to fill.  
All told, and they have become a vast new drain on department manpower and 
resources.31
For example, state and local police in virtually any city now participate in joint 
terrorism task forces with their federal law enforcement counterparts in their 
jurisdictions.32  These task forces typically bring together state and local police with the 
locally-assigned agents of the FBI, immigration, customs, and border patrol agents, port 
security personnel, and other officials. The idea is to build coordinated structures to 
uncover and investigate potential threats, and to prepare for communication and response 
in the event of an attack.
But the new work and manpower demands on state and local police only begin 
with the joint terrorism task forces.  Far less intriguing work abounds, often requiring 
much larger, long-term commitments of resources.33  For example, local police frequently 
find themselves guarding critical public infrastructure items, such as airports, bridges, 
tunnels, stadiums, and the like.34  Any city with a rail or bus system of any size has come 
30 See note 2, supra, and accompanying text.
31
 See, e.g., Jim Ruttenberg and Sewell Chan, In a Shift, New York Says It Will Add 800 Officers, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 22, 2006, at A 23 (quoting Robert Maguire, former New York police commissioner, stating 
that “‘where you have the dual mission of fighting and continuing to reduce crime, and to combat terrorism, 
where we are probably the No. 1 target in the world, you cannot reduce your police force.’”).
32
 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Protecting America Against Terrorist 
Attack: A Closer Look at the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces, December 1, 2004, accessed March 3, 
2006, at  http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec04/jttf120114.htm. 
33
 Nicholas Kulish, Local Police Are Enlisted to Fight Terror, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 30, 2002, at 
B1 (“[O]fficials hope to teach  local police how to fight terrorism…All around the country…police forces 
are focusing on terrorism, both in preventing an attack and handling the aftermath.”)
34
 Fox Butterfield, As Cities Struggle, Police Get By With Less, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004 (many police 
departments have been forced by the federal government to divert considerable resources into protecting 
critical infrastructure, “like airports and water works” against terrorism).
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to see those transit routes as vulnerable, given the train bombings in Madrid in March of 
2004 and the attacks on London’s underground railcars and buses in July of 2005.  Local 
police and transportation security agencies must do whatever it takes to safeguard these 
systems – from putting checkpoints manned by several officers in subway stations, as the 
New York Police Department did in the wake of the London bombings, to installing 
closed-circuit camera systems and other high-tech security items, sometimes costing 
hundreds of millions of dollars.35  Beyond transit systems, local police must also assure 
the security of other kinds of potentially dangerous structures: large industrial 
installations, such as chemical plants or oil refineries; nuclear-powered generating 
stations and other types of electrical facilities; or manufacturing plants that use or ship 
toxic substances as industrial process ingredients or waste.  Police must also keep watch 
over other kinds of facilities not dangerous in themselves but still potential terrorist 
targets: synagogues, mosques, community centers, museums, and landmarks such as 
monuments or historic sites.  Another layer of new responsibilities comes from having to 
safeguard large, temporary gatherings of people.  In the post-9/11 world, such attacks 
loom as a distinct possibility for every big event with substantial visibility: political 
conventions, sporting events, demonstrations, or large outdoor concerts.36
All of these new tasks for state and local police could not have come at a worse 
time.  The new terrorism-related law enforcement burdens would have stretched law 
35
 Sewell Chan, Critics See Risk in M.T.A. Security Pact, N.Y. Times, August 26, 2005, at B 4 (discussing 
awarding of $212 million contract to defense contractor Lockheed Martin to develop a system of video 
cameras, motion sensors, and computers for subway terrorism security); Low-Tech Security, NY Times, 
Oct. 2, 2005, at Sec. 14, p. 13 (detailing plan to spend $600 million on subway security technology, 
including $212 million on 1,000 video cameras)
36
 For example, when Detroit hosted the Super Bowl in February of 2006, law enforcement put the danger 
of terrorism at the top of their list of security concerns, devoting a huge amount of resources to the effort.  
See, e.g., Amber Hunt, Technology Helps Cops Keep Downtown Safe, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 2, 2006, 
at 13 (describing huge amounts of sophisticated, expensive technology used in Detroit “all in the name of 
Super Bowl security.”)
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enforcement thin at any point, but significant economic problems hit state and municipal 
budgets hard at the same time, cutting drastically into their revenues just as these new 
demands landed on police departments.  This combination of forces has made the 
situation truly dire, resulting in once-unthinkable cuts in police personnel.37 This has 
pushed many police departments to “the breaking point,” leaving public safety forces 
dangerously thin – at precisely the same time that the danger of terrorism has emerged.38
And the federal government itself intensified this fiscal squeeze by phasing out a ten 
billion dollar Department of Justice program that had helped localities pay for new local 
police officers.39
Therefore, just as local police took up a whole new array of duties in the post-9/11 
era – from assisting federal law enforcement as part of joint terrorism task forces, to 
protecting the multitude of potential targets for terrorist attacks – they found themselves 
offered new authority to use against potential terrorists: the power to enforce immigration 
law.40  This may seem not surprising; with all the new duties and responsibilities to carry, 
perhaps police needed more power to carry out a job that had become even more difficult 
than usual.  One might therefore expect police to cheer the new power they were offered.    
37
 Fox Butterfield, supra note 34 (many cities coping with budget shortfalls have found themselves forced 
to cut police officers from their police departments).
38
 Kevin Johnson, Police Scoff at Ashcroft Speech, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 2004, at 3A (leadership and 
members of International Association of Chiefs of Police reacted harshly to a speech by then-Attorney 
General John Ashcroft at its convention because “new anti-terrorism duties for local cops – which have 
come as state and local budgets have declined and historically low crime rates have crept upward – have 
pushed police agencies to ‘the breaking point.’”)
39
 Fox Butterfield, supra note 34 (explaining drastic reduction in federal aid to local police departments); 
Kevin Johnson, supra note 40 (discussing opposition to the ending of the program).
40
 Some new post-9/11 power for the police came from the U.S. Supreme Court, see notes 25 through 29, 
supra, and accompanying text, but new power to enforce immigration law came from another source, as 
section III, infra, shows.   
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But this is where the story of police power in the post-9/11 era gets curious.  
Police did not cheer the new authority given to them.  In fact, in a very visible and 
important instance, they not only did not cheer their new authority; they refused it.
III. THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE, TRANSFORMED: HOW “ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION” BECAME “NATIONAL SECURITY”
Americans had concerns about illegal immigration to the U.S. well before 
September 11, 2001.41  According to the most current estimate, between 11.5 and 12 
million undocumented aliens lived in the U.S. in March 2006.42  While they came from 
all over the world, the largest group by far – 78 percent -- came from Latin American 
41
 In fact, in the days before the terrorist attacks, President Vincente Fox of Mexico came to the U.S. to 
meet with President George W. Bush, and the two leaders discussed proposals to address the problem of 
illegal immigration from Mexico.  Ginger Thompson, Mexico President Urges U.S. to Act Soon on 
Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at A 1 (Mexican president’s proposal for an immigration agreement, 
made at the very beginning of his visit to the U.S. on the South Lawn of the White House, “added a new 
sense of urgency” to the issue).  But with the attacks of 9/11, these proposal simply disappeared from the 
political agenda in the U.S. Border Talks on Tap as ‘NAFTA’ Leaders Meet in Mexico, All Things 
Considered, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, March 30, 2006 (“If you'd look all the way back to 2001, Fox has 
been pushing Mr. Bush for a guest worker program. The president was keen on the idea, but a few days 
after that first meeting in Washington were the 9/11 attacks, and that sort of pushed the guest worker plan 
to the bottom of the agenda and Mr. Bush hasn't been able to get it back to [Congress] until” 2005 and 
2006).  Meetings between Bush and Fox in early 2006 were the first attempt to re-start their joint efforts 
since 2001.  Ginger Thompson and David E. Sanger, Bush and Fox Repeat Vows on Immigration, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 1, 2006, at A 9 (“Five years after they first pledged to work together to find ways to open 
legal channels for Mexicans to seek work in the United States, President Bush and President Vicente Fox 
ended a two-day meeting on Friday essentially where they were in 2001…”).
42
 Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S., 
Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey, Pew Hispanic Center, at 2 (best estimate 
for March 2006 is between 11.5 and 12 million unauthorized migrants).  Passel uses the term “unauthorized 
migrants” instead of illegal immigrants or illegal aliens; he defines it as “a person who resides in the United 
States but who is not a U.S. citizen, has not been admitted for permanent residence, and is not in a set of 
specific authorized temporary statuses permitting longer-term residence and work.”  Id. at i (emphases in 
original).
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countries, chiefly Mexico.43  Illegal immigration from Mexico has long supplied the 
American economy with cheap labor for agriculture, cleaning, construction, food 
preparation and many other sectors of the economy.44 This has created a steady stream of 
migrants flowing from the grinding poverty and pervasive unemployment of Mexico and 
other Latin American countries to the U.S. in search of jobs and wages.  These migrants 
may get only difficult and menial jobs, and illegal status makes them susceptible to 
cheating on wages and other forms of exploitation.  But the existence of relatively well-
paying work in the U.S. makes the country an irresistible magnet.  With little chance to 
earn enough to support their families in their own countries, many Mexicans and other 
Latin Americans simply see no alternative to economic migration to the U.S., whatever 
the legalities. The U.S. has a steadily growing economy and a need for workers to do 
unskilled work at low wages, even as severe Mexican and Latin American poverty 
persist.  This creates a “‘push-pull’” dynamic between “prosperity-fueled job 
opportunities in the United States in contrast to limited or nonexistent job opportunities in 
sending countries.”45  This pattern has characterized immigration to the U.S. for years; 
the search for jobs and better wages drives most unauthorized migration, and almost 
always has.46  Indeed, the American economy has become addicted to underpaid illegal 
labor, which provides us with everything from fresh fruits and vegetables, to construction 
work, to clean hotel rooms, to restaurant food – all at prices well below what we would 
43
 Id. at 4 (of all unauthorized migrants, 56 percent came from Mexico and 22 percent came from other 
Latin American countries, chiefly countries in Cental America, for a total of 78 percent).
44
 Id. (unauthorized migrants make up significant shares of all workers in farming occupations (24 percent), 
cleaning (17 percent), construction (14 percent), and food preparation (12 percent).
45
 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Unauthorized Aliens in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, Congressional 
Research Service, September 15, 2004, at 5.
46
 Rakesh Lochlar, Latino Labor Report, 2004: More Jobs for New Immigrants but at Lower Wages, Pew 
Hispanic Center, Washington, D.C., May 2005, accessed at 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=45.
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otherwise have to pay.47  For all of these reasons, Americans on all sides of the 
immigration debate have, until recently, typically seen illegal immigration as an 
economic and labor issue: do illegal immigration take jobs from Americans?  Does this 
depress wages?  Does it strain the finances of our social support systems?48
Then came September 11, 2001.  The events of that day transformed the 
immigration debate – from one about economics, about rich and poor nations, about legal 
and illegal labor, to one about a different concept: national security.
A. The Attacks and the Immediate Aftermath
Americans learned soon after September 11, 2001, that none of the attackers held 
U.S. citizenship; all but two of them had entered the U.S. legally.  They had taken 
advantage of our openness to outsiders, and had used our own assets – the aviation 
industry, the internet, the banking system – to carefully plan and execute a precision 
strike against some of our highest-profile targets.  All nineteen of them were young 
Muslim men from the Middle East; fifteen were from one country alone – Saudi Arabia.  
47 See, e.g., Eric Schlosser, REEFER MADNESS (2003) (making the case that the American economy, and all
who benefit from it, are addicted to the availability of low-wage illegal  labor); Eduardo Porter, Who Will 
Work the Farms?, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2006, at C 1 (farmers, who need low-wage workers to run their 
operations competitively, will use legal guest workers if possible, but will certainly use illegal immigrants 
if guest worker programs do not work or do not materialize; quotes one farmer who has hired legal guest 
workers as saying “ ‘We would rather use legal workers,’ but ‘if we don’t get a reasonable guest worker 
program we are going to hire illegals.’”). 
48
 This set of issues, particularly the question of whether or not illegal immigration depresses wages, 
remains part of the dialogue today.  See, e.g., George J. Borjas and Lawrence F. Katz, The Evolution of the 
Mexican-Born Workforce in the United States,  National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper 11281 (April, 2005), accessed at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11281, at 37 (illegal 
immigration from Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s “lowered the wage of most native workers…[[t]he wage 
fell by 8.2 percent for high school dropouts, and by 3.8 percent for college graduates.”)  Others believe that 
the effect of illegal immigration on wages is far less.  Eduardo Porter, Cost of Illegal Immigration May Be 
Less Than Meets the Eye, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2006, at Bu 4 (surveying a number of economists and their 
works which portray the effect of illegal immigration on wages as “much, much lower” than the Borjas and 
Katz have estimated).
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And all were part of al Qaeda – a terrorist group based, at that time, in Afghanistan, 
whose leadership acted on what it claimed were Islamic religious principles. 
Despite rhetoric to the contrary from the President himself,49 the federal government 
quickly began to go after Muslim immigrants from Middle Eastern countries with great 
vigor, in pursuit of possible terrorist cells.  In the first several months after the attacks, 
the government incarcerated hundreds of Muslims, mostly from the Middle East and 
South Asian countries, in order to investigate them for links to al Qaeda.50  Not one of 
these hundreds of people had any connection to terrorism.51  The government charged a 
few with petty crimes; it held the overwhelming number on immigration violations.52
Many were detained for months; under the FBI’s “hold until cleared” policy, the 
authorities refused to release them despite the lack of any substantive evidence until the 
FBI essentially proved their innocence to its own satisfaction.53  Most were held 
incommunicado, without benefit of counsel and without any criminal charges lodged;54
once cleared, the government deported them based on immigration violations.55
The federal government also investigated Middle Easterners in other ways.  In 
November of 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft’s Department of Justice announced a 
new initiative: federal agents would interview 5,000 young men regarding terrorism.56
49
 Dana Milbank and Emily Wax, Bush Visits Mosque to Forestall Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 
2001, at A1 (detailing President Bush’s personal visit to the Islamic Center of Washington to speak against 
retaliation against American Arabs and Muslims).
50
 Office of the Inspector General, supra note 110.
51
 Id. at ; see also Eric Boehlert, The Dragnet Comes Up Empty, SALON, June 19, 2002 (quoting 
Department of Justice official as stating that among the 128 criminal charges that have been filed against 
the 1,000-plus detainees, none…have been for terrorist activity.”)
52
 Office of the Inspector General, supra note 10, at Chapter 6.
53 Id. at 38-40.
54 Id. at 39; Susan Sachs, U.S. Defends Withholding of Jailed Immigrants’ Names, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 
2002.
55 Id. at Chapter 6.
56
 Deputy Attorney General of the U.S., Memorandum for All United States Attorneys, All Members of the 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Nov. 9, 2001 (copy on file with the author).
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The young men were not suspects; furthermore, the interviews were to be strictly 
voluntary.57  But all of the men on the list had recently entered the U.S. from Muslim 
countries.58  As for the voluntariness of these interviews, they would take place against 
the backdrop of the roundups and detentions of Muslim Middle Easterners already 
occurring; thus it seemed likely that interviewees would fear displeasing the federal 
government by refusing to talk.  And the Deputy Attorney General’s instructions for 
carrying out the interviews made the game even clearer: although the interviews did not 
concern  immigration issues, agents could surely check on the interviewee’s status before 
the interview took place59 – no doubt to have a little bit of persuasive leverage available 
should the interviewee fail to see the virtue in a “voluntary” interview.  
By the end of 2001, a clear pattern had emerged.  The federal government would 
pursue, detain, or investigate anyone it suspected of involvement with terrorism on even 
the thinnest of evidence, and the Department of Justice would use any legal method 
available to carry out this mission.  Because it wished above all to stop terrorists before 
they could strike again, the government would not hesitate to go forward without 
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of terrorist conduct – the amount of 
evidence usually needed under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to proceed 
with an arrest or even a brief detention.60  Instead, the government would use “pretexts” –
laws meant for other situations and other purposes, but which could be pressed into 
service as an excuse to allow the government to detain and investigate persons suspected 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Deputy Attorney General of the U.S., supra note 56, at .
60 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (articulating standard of probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing a temporary detention and a pat down of outer clothing when police officer has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing).
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of terrorist involvement.  There is nothing new in this tactic; for example, police have 
used traffic enforcement for years as a pretext to conduct drug interdiction through 
searches of vehicles and drivers.61  Attorney General Ashcroft himself talked openly 
about using any available pretext to investigate terrorists suspects.  Ashcroft invoked the 
famous statement by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, then engaged in an effort to 
prosecute major organized crime figures, who said that the government would gladly 
arrest gangsters for any minor crime, even “spitting on the sidewalk;” Ashcroft said he 
would take the same approach against potential terrorists.62  And chief among the tools 
available to Ashcroft was immigration law.63
Using immigration law as a pretext to investigate immigrants has a number of 
important advantages.  In contrast to run-of-the-mill criminal investigations, in which the 
government must obey search and seizure rules, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule does not apply in immigration proceedings.64  Under the Fourth Amendment, the 
authorities must have some (small) amount of evidence – probable cause, or just 
reasonable suspicion – to search or detain a person;65 with no exclusionary rule in effect, 
immigration investigations simply do not require this.  Fifth Amendment protections 
61 See, e.g., David Cole, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (1999);David A. Harris, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002);  
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops,  51 MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, Car Wars: 
The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 566 (1998); David A. Sklansky, 
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271; 
Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 71 N.Y.U. L. R. 956 
(1999).
62
 Speech by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Oct. 25, 2001, 
accessed at http://usdoj.gov.ag/speeches/2001/afcrisisremarks10_25.htm, May 21, 2004.
63
 Immigration law, while the most frequently used pretextual basis for these detentions, was not the only 
one.  Another was the use of the federal statute authorizing detention of material witnesses, 18 U.S.C. 3144.  
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, New Scrutiny for Law On Material Witnesses, N. Y. TIMES, March 22, 2003, at A 
18 (indicating increasing concern about the use of material witness law to accomplish preventive 
detentions).
64 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deciding Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does 
not apply in a civil deportation hearing).
65 See note 60, supra, and accompanying text.
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apply in the immigration context vis-a-vis questioning; the government cannot compel 
suspected immigration law violators to incriminate themselves.  However, should an 
immigration suspect choose to avail himself of the right to remain silent, the fact finder 
can draw an adverse inference from a failure of the suspect to speak – something not 
allowed in the typical criminal case.  The Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases 
require that anyone charged and detained come before a judicial officer promptly, usually 
in less than 48 hours, to ascertain whether probable cause exists for the authorities to hold 
the defendant pending charges;66 these rules do not apply in the immigration arena.  
These and other differences between the protections available to suspects in immigration 
contexts versus criminal procedure give the government vastly more power under 
immigration law than the criminal law would in any dealings with an immigrant, and 
impose much less oversight and accountability.  Best of all from the government’s point 
of view, finding an immigration violation is relatively simple.  All the government need 
do is find a reason that the immigrant is “out of status” – i.e., out of compliance with his 
or her visa conditions, whether this constitutes a civil violation or a crime.  Among the 
most common forms of civil “out of status” violations are overstaying one’s visa67 and 
66 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (requiring probable cause hearing for detained 
arrestee within 48 hours in most cases).
67
 Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 237 (a) (1) (B), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227 (a) (1) (B) (making deportable 
“[a]ny alien who is present in the United States in violation of this Act…”) is sometimes invoked when an 
individual violates the conditions under which he or she was admitted, such as the time limits of one’s visa.  
This kind of violation will also trigger Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 237 (a) (1) (C) (1), 8 U.S.C. 
sec. 1227 (a) (1) (C) (1), which makes deportable “[a]ny alien who…has failed to maintain the 
nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted…or to comply with the conditions of any such 
status…”  See Karageorgious v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (aliens who stayed in U.S. after 
expiration of visa period and without other authorization were deportable under 8 U.S.C. sec 1227 (a) (1) 
(C) (i), and were not deprived of due process by elimination of suspension of deportation proceedings 
under new statute); Milande v. INS, 484 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1973) (proof of overstay requires only that 
government show alien’s admission to U.S. for a temporary period, that the period had elapsed, and that 
alien had not departed).
23
violating rules against employment while temporarily in the country.68  But other simple 
ways to violate immigration laws abound.  For example, immigrants in the U.S. on 
student visas must maintain a “full course of study” to qualify for residence in the U.S.69
Should the immigrant student’s record show fewer credit hours than required – because 
of a clerical error, a misunderstanding about the credits a course carries, or just dropping 
a course, for example – the student would fall out of compliance and would become 
subject to deportation.70
Illegal immigration, especially from Latin America, had been a concern in many areas 
of the U.S. for years. After 9/11, with immigration law coming into use as one of the 
primary levers law enforcement would use in domestic efforts to fight terrorists, many of 
those who had long opposed illegal immigration from Latin America, began to re-cast 
their arguments into efforts to protect national security against terrorism.  They saw 
September 11 and its aftermath as an opportunity: they began to talk about the U.S.’s 
broken immigration system and porous borders with Mexico not as an economic or labor 
problem, but as an anti-terrorism problem.  Potential terrorists could easily enter the 
United States across the Southwestern border, just as thousands of Mexicans and Central 
Americans did every day in search of work.  If poor, uneducated economic migrants 
could do it, surely a determined terrorist could, too.  Mark Krikorian, executive director 
of the Center for Immigration Studies, has made this very point.   
68
 Working without proper permission would violate the same statutes.  Immigration and Nationality Act 
sec. 237 (a) (1) (B), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227 (a) (1) (B) and sec. 237 (a) (1) (C) (1), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227 (a) (1) 
(C) (1).  See, e.g., Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1978) (student’s full-time employment, without 
any authorization from the INS, made student deportable for failing to comply with conditions of status).
69
 Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. (a) (15) (F), 8 U.S.C. sec 1101 (a) (15) (F) (allowing student visas 
for an alien “who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the 
United States temporarily and soley for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study…”).
70 Id.; Khano v. INS, 999 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1993) (student’s admission that he had not maintained full-
time study sufficient to serve as basis for deportability).
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In a very real sense, the primary weapons of our enemies are not 
inamimate objects at all, but rather the terrorists themselves—especially 
in the case of suicide attackers.  Thus keeping the terrorists out or 
apprehending them after they get in is indispensable to victory [in the 
war on terror]….[C]ontrolling the Mexican border, apart from other 
benefits it would produce, is an important security objective; at least two 
major rings have been uncovered which smuggled Middle Easterners 
into the United States from Mexico, with help from corrupt Mexican 
government employees.71
Many strongly disagreed with the basic assumptions underlying this argument.  For 
example, researchers at the Migration Policy Institute came to a much different 
conclusion regarding the intersection of immigration policy and the war against terrorism.
Al Qaeda’s hijackers were chosen to avoid detection: all but two were 
educated young men from middle-class families with no criminal record 
and no known connection to terrorism…This does not mean that 
immigration controls are not useful.  It means they are only as useful as 
the information provided by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  
What immigration measures are able to do is bar terrorists about whom the 
government already has information from entering the country, and set up 
gateways and tracking systems so that someone already here can be found 
if intelligence agencies identify him as a suspect.72
Nevertheless, advocates against illegal immigration transformed their argument – despite 
a lack of any convincing evidence that the border with Mexico presented any kind of 
national security or terrorist threat.73  No matter – immigration became a national security 
issue.  
71Mark Krikorian, Keeping Terror Out – Immigration Policy and Asymmetric Warfare, THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST, Spring 2004.  For more detail on this transformation, see David A. Harris, supra note 18, at 193-
194.
72
 Muzaffar A. Chishti, Doris Meissner, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michal J. Wishnie & 
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Security 
Afer September 11, 5-7, Migration Policy Institute, 2003.
73
  Krikorian himself cites only one example of such a danger: a man named Mahmoud Kourani, the brother 
of Hizbollah’s security chief, allegedly entered the country this way.  Mark Krikorian, supra note 71.  But 
Kourani, arrested in Dearborn, Michigan with much anti-terrorism fanfare, was found guilty only of 
harboring an illegal immigrant, not terrorism-related activitiy, and served only several months in jail.  
David Shepardson, FBI Links Two Terror Cases, DETROIT NEWS, April 18, 2004, at 1B.  Others besides 
Krikorian have made the argument as well.  See, e.g., Tony Blankley, THE WEST’S LAST CHANCE: WILL 
WE WIN THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? 172 (Regnery, 2005) (arguing that the Mexican border with the 
U.S. is a national security threat, based on Congressional testimony by Deputy Director of Homeland 
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B.  The Federal Response: Give Local Police New Discretionary Power to Enforce 
Immigration Law 
The government’s response to these currents in the post-9/11 environment seems 
predictable: an increase in the duties of local police, and increased police power to enable 
police to meet these responsibilities.  Advocates of immigration restriction began their 
own parallel efforts based on a national security, anti-terrorism rationale, to see that local 
police also would have a role in, and increased authority specifically for, immigration 
enforcement.  Given the immediate nature of the threat, it was not the courts but the 
legislative and executive branches that allied and took action to make this happen. U.S. 
Department of Justice officials made decisions, and members of Congress began to craft 
and introduce legislation, that would involve local and state police agencies in 
immigration enforcement, to a much greater degree than had ever happened before.  
With illegal immigration cast as a national security issue, it would have to become a 
top priority for all law enforcement agencies, along with terrorism.  The federal agencies 
charged with enforcement along the border had never had adequate staff in terms of the 
number of agents needed to do the job.  Despite President Bush’s attention to the issue of 
illegal immigration early in his presidency, none of his budgets or plans or proposals
Security James Loy on Feb. 16, 2005, given before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.)  Blankley 
says that Loy testified that “[r]ecent information from ongoing investigations, detentions, and emerging 
threat streams strongly suggests that al Qaeda has considered using the southwest border to infiltrate the 
United States.  Several al Qaeda leaders believe operatives can pay their way into the country through 
Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational security 
purposes.” Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Current and Projected 
National Security Threats to the United States, S. Hrg. 109-61, Feb. 16, 2005, at 40-41.  Tellingly, 
Blankley fails to mention the very next sentence in Loy’s testimony:  “However, there is currently no 
conclusive evidence that indicates al-Qaida operatives have made successful penetrations into the United 
States via this method.  Id. at 41. See also  Jennifer Ludden, Consular ID Cards for Aliens Draw Fire, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Morning Edition, Nov. 25, 2003 (quoting David Aufhauser, former Treasury 
Department official in the Bush Administration, as describing asserted connection between of illegal 
immigrants from Mexico and their use of the Mexican an matricula consular cards to facilitate  terrorist 
operations from across the Mexican border as “comic” and completely lacking in any evidence). 
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made any provision for hiring the number of federal agents necessary to address the 
problem with any real prospect of success; even Bush’s 2006 plan to increase the Border 
Patrol’s staffing by 6,000 agents, to a total of 18,000, drew fire from critics who called it 
completely inadequate.74  Thus government proponents of stronger border protections 
had to look somewhere else for manpower: state and local police forces. And they 
resolved to do this with a series of legislative proposals that would give local police new 
authority to enforce immigration law.75
These new proposals did not come against a blank slate.  First, state and local police 
had always had the authority to make arrests for the most serious immigration offenses, 
such as felonies like returning to the U.S. illegally after deportation,76 or absconding and 
remaining in the country after a deportation order.77  This limited authority did not,
however, extend to low-level civil infractions, such as violating immigration status.  
Second, since 1996, the federal government had had an existing program that invited 
74
 Michael Hedges, Bush Budget Scraps 9,790 Border Patrol Agents, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 9, 2005 
(despite earlier promise to hire 10,000 new border patrol agents, president’s proposed 2006 budget funded 
only 210 new border patrol officers); Mark Sappenfield, Guard’s Impact at Border, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., 
May 17, 2006 (“[E]ven the ultimate goal – 18,000 border patrol agents – is insufficient, critics say.”) 
75
 Thus one difference between past crime “crises” and the post-9/11 era in the enlargement of police 
discretion is the fact that, in the past, the increase in police discretion came mostly, or even entirely, from 
courts, as they passed upon the constitutional propriety of police action.  In contrast, the prospect of 
increased discretion in the post-9/11 immigration context came from proposed legislative action, not court 
decision.  It also came in the form of executive-branch actions and interpretations of existing law, but the 
greatest potential for increase in police discretion in the immigration area arose from legislative action, as 
detailed in this Section of this article.  But this distinction has no real significance; more discretion for 
police means more discretion, whether it last until courts re-interpret their own decisions or the actions of 
the legislative branch, or until the legislative branch repeals laws it has made.  Perhaps its only significance 
is that we are more likely to see discretion enlarged through legislative action when the need is perceived to 
be dire and immediate, and political leaders feel the need to act instead of waiting years for courts to react 
to police actions.  This would follow the pattern set by enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. Law 
107-56 (2001), enacted just weeks after the 9/11 attacks to enlarge the power and discretion of federal law 
enforcement agencies.
76
 Immigration and Naturalization Act sec. 276 (a), 8 U.S.C. sec 1326 (a) (making any alien who has been, 
inter alia, deported and who thereafter “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United 
States,” subject to fine, jail for up to two years, or both).
77
 Immigration and Naturalization Act sec. 243 (a), 8 U.S.C. sec 1253 (a) (any alien against whom a final 
deportation order is outstanding who does not depart within 90 days is subject to a fine, may be jailed for 
up to four years (ten years in some limited circumstances), or both).
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state and local police departments to become involved extensively in immigration 
enforcement.  Under Section 287 (g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,78 the U.S. 
government and any state or local police department willing to become involved in 
immigration enforcement could sign a Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU.  Under 
the MOU, some members of the state or local police department would receive extensive 
training in the wide-ranging complexities of immigration law enforcement.79  They would 
then enforce some aspects of immigration law under the “direction and supervision” of 
federal immigration authorities.80   States and localities would foot the expense of their 
own involvement in these efforts.81
The MOU structure had much to recommend it from the point of view of professional 
and effective policing, especially the training and supervision that these arrangements 
required.82  But from the point of view of advocates for greater state and local police 
involvement in immigration enforcement, the MOU structure did not do enough – simply 
because it did not require police departments to join in the enforcement of immigration 
law; rather, it allowed them to choose whether or not to do so.  Prior to September 11, 
78
 Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. 287 (g), 8 U.S.C. sec. 1357 (g). 
79
 Id. at (g) (2) (noting that the MOU must “contain a written certification that the officers…have received 
adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws”).  According to one 
source, the training consists of a “five-week training course.”  Miriam Jordan, The New Immigration Cops,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 2, 2006, at B1.
80
 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357 (g) (3) (“In performing an [immigration enforcement] function under this section,” 
state and local police “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General”).  Since the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, MOU functions are now under the direction of 
that Department, not the Department of Justice.
81
 Id. at (g) (state and local police forces performing under an MOU “may carry out [immigration 
enforcement tasks] at the expense of the State or political subdivision…”).
82 See, e.g., James Jay Carafano, No Need for the CLEAR Act: Building Capacity for Immigration 
Counterterrorism Investigations, Executive Memorandum # 925, The Heritage Foundation, April 21, 2004, 
accessed at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em925.cfm?renderforprint=1, Feb. 2, 
2006.  Of course, this only addresses the policy perspective; at least one scholar has argued that 
constitutional federal exclusivity in the immigration sphere prohibits these arrangements.  Huyen Pham, 
The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why inviting Loacl Enforcement of the Immigration 
Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. L. REV. 965 (2004).
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2001, no state or local police department had chosen to enter into an MOU with the 
federal government; even in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, only one 
agency – the Florida State Police – signed an MOU.83  More recently, several other 
agencies have done so.84 Others agencies have reportedly begun to consider doing so,85
but the number remains negligible relative to the roughly 18,000 state and local police 
agencies in the country.86  It seems that, given the chance to voluntarily undertake 
immigration enforcement duties, even with a commitment to proper training and federal 
83 Id. at 2 (“…Florida signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2002 to allow a small group of 
Florida law enforcement officers to conduct federal immigration investigations.”); Miriam Jordan, supra 
note 79, at B 1 (“Florida, the first state to join the federal program in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, tailored its version to help block possible terrorist infiltrators.”)
84 Id. (citing the Alabama state police as operating under an MOU, and the Costa Mesa Police Department 
and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, both in California, have decided to enter into MOUs).  Other 
agencies under MOUs reportedly include at least one agency in Arizona, the San Bernardino County 
(California) Sheriff’s Department, and a group of Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies who 
work exclusively at the Los Angeles County Jail.  Report, Forcing Our Blues into Gray Areas: Local 
Police and Federal Immigration Enforcement, Appleseed, Jan. 2006, at 3, 11, 19, accessed at 
http://appleseeds.net/servlet/PublicationInfo?articleId=70 (hereinafter, Forcing Our Blues into Gray Areas) 
(reporting that state police in Florida, Arizona, and Alabama, an sheriff’s offices in Los Angeles County 
and San Bernardino County, California have signed MOUs).  
85
 Miriam Jordan, supra note 79, at B1 (stating that “a slew of cities and states in the U.S. are increasingly 
taking on the duty” of immigration work, but identifying only Florida and Alabama as having actually done 
so and Costa Mesa and Orange County as having decided to do so.  The article states that federal 
immigration authorities have “received requests from several states in New England and the Midwest, as 
well as counties in Texas and California, which are interested in immigration training,” but does not 
identify these interested police agencies any further.  One wonders whether this is because there is, in fact, 
no groundswell of support among law enforcement to take on these tasks, even within the MOU structure.  
Other reports on the issue seem to show that Ms. Jordan may have greatly overstated law enforcement 
enthusiasm for the MOU arrangement.  Richard Winton and Daniel Yi, Police Split on Plan for Migrant 
Checks, L.A TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006 (reporting strong negative reaction of top law enforcement officials in 
Los Angeles County to decisions of Costa Mesa Police and Orange County Sheriff to enter into MOUs).  A 
later article on MOU arrangements identified individual police agencies in Florida, Alabama, Arizona. Los 
Angeles County, and San Bernardino County as having trained some of their officers under MOUs, and “11 
additional state and county jurisdictions have applied to enter the program in the past year…,” still a 
relatively small number by any reckoning.  Paul Vitello, Path to Deportation Can Start With a Traffic Stop,
N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2006, at A1.  An attempt by the author to obtain further information or clarification 
from Ms. Jordan of the Wall Street Journal -- even just a definition of “slew” – went unanswered.  Email 
communication from the author to Miriam Jordan, Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2006 (copy on file with 
the author).   
86
 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Law Enforcement Statistics, accessed April 4, 2006, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (stating that there are just under 18,000 state and local police 
agencies in the U.S.).  Even the largest estimate found by the author (five agencies active under MOUs, 
with 11 more having applied) Paul Vitello, supra note 85, is nothing more than a tiny fraction of U.S. 
police agencies.
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supervision necessary to the task, the overwhelming number of police agencies simply 
have no desire to get involved.  
Given this tepid response to the federal offer to become enforcers of immigration law, 
those who wanted more state and local police involvement in immigration matters 
realized that they could not rely on voluntary efforts.  They would, instead, have to use 
pressure and coercion. 
The first step in this process came in April of 2002, when the U.S. Department of 
Justice announced a new policy.  Until that point, everyone involved in immigration 
enforcement had understood that while state and local police had limited authority to 
enforce the most serious immigration law provisions,87 they did not have authority to take 
action against much less serious civil immigration offenses.  This interpretation of the 
law had been reviewed and reaffirmed several times by the Department of Justice, most 
recently in 1996.88  But the Department of Justice’s new April 2002 policy, based on a 
new legal opinion, differed significantly from the prior understandings.  According to the 
new opinion, state and local police had “inherent authority” to enforce all immigration 
laws – serious and less so, criminal or civil.89  Therefore, said the Justice Department, 
state and local police agencies should no longer consider themselves limited in the 
87 See, e.g.,  notes 76-77, supra.
88 Memorandum from the Officer of the Associate Deputy Attorney General, to the U.S. Attorney, Southern 
District of California, Feb. 5, 1996, accessed at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopo1a.htm.  
89
 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Non-
preemption of the authority of state and local law enforcement officials to arrest aliens for immigration 
violations, April 3, 2002 (copy on file with the author).  Incredibly, even though the opinion constituted a 
180-degree reversal of years of long-standing immigration enforcement policy, the Department of Justice 
refused to release the opinion publicly, instead simply announcing the new policy.  The opinion itself was 
not released until a lawsuit forced the Department to do so; only after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in 
National Council of La Raza v. Department of Justice, Dkt. No 04-5474-cv, and mandated the release of 
the opinion, did the government finally do so, albeit with a heavily redacted version.
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immigration enforcement arena; on the contrary, they had full authority to do anything 
any federal agent could do.
With the legal path for state and local police involvement prepared by the Justice 
Department’s new “inherent authority” policy,90 members of Congress allied with the 
advocates of immigration enforcement by state and local police ratcheted up the pressure.  
Representative Charlie Norwood of Georgia introduced a bill in the 108th Congress called 
the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal, or CLEAR, Act.91  The CLEAR 
Act and its Senate counterpart, the Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA),92
made apparent how far the proponents of greater state and local involvement in 
immigration enforcement had shifted the debate.  Under CLEAR and the HSEA, the 
federal government said, state and local police should get involved in immigration 
enforcement using their new inherent powers;93  at the very least, they were to have no 
policies that in any way limited their police officers in enforcing immigration laws such 
as those that prohibited police officers from questioning people about their immigration 
90
 This article does not take a position on the correctness of the new DOJ policy; instead, it views the policy 
as a given, an illustration of what those wanting greater local enforcement of immigration laws wanted to 
accomplish and one of the steps they took to attain their goals.  The policy has been criticized elsewhere, 
but that discussion is beyond the scope of what the author wishes to accomplish here.  For an analysis of 
the “inherent authority” issue, see, e.g., Huyen Pham, supra note ___, at 987-998 (arguing for an 
exclusively federal immigration power which must be exercised uniformly, and that cannot be exercised by 
states or localities).
91
 U.S. House of Representatives, Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 
(108th Cong.). 
92
 U.S. Senate, Homeland Security Enhancement Act, S. 1906 (108th Cong.).  Disclosure: the author 
testified against the Homeland Security Enhancement Act before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Immigration.  David A. Harris, The Homeland Security Enhancement Act: The Wrong Way to Public 
Safety, April 22, 2004, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1156&wit_id=3324. 
93
 U.S. House of Representatives, Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 
(108th Cong.), sec. 101 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law and reaffirming the existing general 
authority, law enforcement personnel of a State or a political subdivision of a State are fully authorized to 
investigate, apprehend, detain, or remove aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such 
aliens across State lines to detention centers), in the enforcement of the immigration laws of the United 
States.”)
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status.94  Any local government or police department that retained policies like this would 
lose sorely-needed federal reimbursement funds available for the millions of dollars 
localities spent when they detained persons who turn out to be illegal immigrants.95  For a 
number of states and counties, these detentions represent a considerable expense, and the 
CLEAR Act and the HSEA represented a pointed threat: state and local police must get 
involved against illegal immigration, or states would have to carry the cost of detaining 
illegal immigrants without any federal help.  While the CLEAR Act and the HSEA 
recognized that state and local police would face dauntingly complex legal and 
enforcement question if they did get involved – the bills mandated the preparation of 
some rudimentary instructional materials96 -- the Act made no resources available for 
training or extra supervision.  In fact, the CLEAR Act and the HSEA explicitly stated that 
local police need not have any training to do immigration enforcement.97
Apart from Congressional efforts, the Department of Justice itself made another 
attempt to get local police into immigration enforcement: the Department began to put 
information on immigration violations into the National Crime Information Center 
94
 For examples of some of these so-called sanctuary policies, see notes 112 through 118, supra, and 
accompanying text.
95
 U.S. House of Representatives, Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 
(108th Cong.), sec. 102 (“…a State (or political subdivision of a State) that fails to have in effect a statute 
that expressly authorizes law enforcement officers of the State, or of a political subdivision within the 
State, to enforce Federal immigration laws in the course of carrying out the officer's law enforcement duties 
shall not receive any of the funds that would otherwise be allocated to the State under section 241(i) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act...”)
96
 U.S. House of Representatives, Clear Law Enforcement for Criinal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 
(108th Cong.), sec. 109 (a) (“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Attorney General or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security shall establish a trainingmanual 
for law enforcement personnel of a State or a political subdivision of a State that has in effect a statute 
under section 102 or a policy under section 105 to train such personnel in the investigation, identification, 
apprehension, arrest, detention, and removal of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of 
such aliens across State lines to detention centers and identification of fraudulent documents).”)
97
 U.S. House of Representatives, Clear Law Enforcement for Criinal Alien Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 
(108th Cong.), sec. 109 (d) (“Nothing in this Act or any other provision of law shall be construed as making 
any immigration-related training a requirement for or prerequisite to any State or local law enforcement 
officer to enforce Federal immigration laws in the normal course of carrying out their law enforcement 
duties.”)
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(NCIC) database.98  The NCIC99 holds all of the records police need to search in the 
course of their routine enforcement tasks every day: arrest warrants, stolen vehicle 
reports, and criminal records, among others.  Police officers all over the country make 
millions of NCIC queries every day.  For example, every time a police officer makes a 
traffic stop, the officer probably queries NCIC to get criminal histories, to check whether 
or not anyone has reported either the vehicle of the license tags it displays stolen, and to 
ascertain whether any outstanding warrants exist for the driver.  Should a warrant for the 
driver (or for anyone else the officer has checked) show up in NCIC, the officer arrests 
the person; the report of the warrant from NCIC serves as probable cause for the arrest.  
Beginning in 2002 and 2003, the Department of Justice began putting into NCIC 
information on civil immigration violations.100 By late 2003, the Department of Justice 
had added more than 300,000 names of noncitizens subject to civil deportation orders to 
NCIC.101 Most of these cases concerned noncitizens who failed to leave the country when 
their visas expired.102 The Department later expanded this policy by putting into NCIC 
records of foreign students who had fallen “out of status” by failing to maintain enough 
credits, earn minimum grades, or violating some other student visa condition.103  All of 
this meant that, whenever local police made an NCIC query and immigration violations 
showed up, officers would likely feel compelled to make an arrest.
98 E.g.,  Hector Gutierrez, Agents Seek Alien Fugititves, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 28, 2002 (Justice 
Department “entering the names of the absconders into the National Crime Information Center, the 
database for criminal records, so local law enforcement agencies can be aware of fugitives wanted by the 
INS and with whom they come in contact.”); Minority Groups Sue Over Crime Database, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE,  Dec. 18, 2003, at A 14 (lawsuit aims “to stop the federal government from entering 
immigration information into a national crime database, saying the practice illegally targets immigrants 
under the guise of post-Sept. 11 security.”) 
99
 The NCIC and its use are governed by federal statute.  See 28 U.S.C. sec. 534.
100
 Nina Bernstein, Crime Database Misused for Civil Issues, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A 5 (detailing 
use of NCIC by U.S. Justice Department for civil immigration violations.)
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. 
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Putting millions of pieces of immigration information into NCIC raised two 
important problems.  First, immigration information from the government is notoriously 
inaccurate and out of date.  Recall, for example, the issuance by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service of visa extensions for two of the dead suicide hijackers of the 
September 11, 2001 plot – six months after saturation news coverage revealed their 
identities and faces to the world.104  Nothing indicates that the accuracy or timeliness of 
immigration records has improved since, even with the transformation of the INS into a 
component of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE), which is 
itself part of the Department of Homeland S ecurity.  On the contrary, the opposite 
appears to hold true.  According to a study released by the Migration Policy Institute in 
December of 2005, data from the Department of Homeland Security dating from 2002 
through 2004 show that immigration information in the NCIC is incorrect 42 percent of 
the time when it identified immigrants police stopped as wanted.105  Including so much 
typically inaccurate immigration information risks contamination of this crucial law 
enforcement resource.  When this happens, the result is not increased security, based on 
“better-safe-than-sorry” reasoning; rather, our police officers waste crucial law 
enforcement time and manpower, through absolutely no fault of their own.  Second, 
inserting this immigration information into NCIC remains flat-out illegal.106  According 
to Professor Michael Wishnie of New York University Law School, Congress created the 
104 E.g., David Johnston, 6 Months Late, I.N.S. Notifies Flight School of Hijackers' Visas, N.Y. Times, 
March 13, 2002, at 16 (“Six months after Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi crashed hijacked airliners 
into the World Trade Center, the Immigration and Naturalization Service sent out a routine notice this week 
telling a flight school that the two men had been approved for student visas to study there.”) 
105
 Michael Wishnie et al., Blurring the Lines, Migration Policy Institute, December 2005 (hereinafter 
Blurring the Lines); see also Rachel L. Swarns, Crime Database Often Wrong on Immigration, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005.
106
 8 U.S.C. 1252c (a), (b) (state and local police allowed to arrest and detain aliens apprehended in the U.S. 
who were previously convicted of felony and either left or deported the U.S., and in formation concerning 
such individuals may be placed in the NCIC database); see also Blurring the Lines, supra note 105, at 6-7.
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NCIC database with a strong awareness of the importance of its accuracy.  Because law 
enforcement officers use NCIC to make crucial decisions when handling people whom 
they do not know, decisions that directly impact the safety of both officers and the public, 
Professor Wishnie says that “Congress carefully delineated the categories of information 
that may be entered into this very powerful database” in order to ensure its correctness 
and completeness.107  And neither the use of NCIC nor the data it contains have ever had 
anything to do with immigration.  Thus in its zeal to get local law enforcement to enforce 
immigration law, the Department of Justice showed itself both willing to violate the law, 
and to corrupt a vital and basic law enforcement tool.  All of this comes against the 
background of the federal government’s claim that it inserted the immigration 
information into NCIC for one purpose: fighting terrorism and apprehending terrorists.  
Alberto Gonzales, then Counsel to the President and now Attorney General, made the 
point explicit: “Only high-risk aliens who fit a terrorist profile will be placed in NCIC.  
The Administration is taking these measures in its effort strengthen homeland security 
and combat terrorism.”108  It thus seems curious, then, that most of the immigrants whose 
information the Department of Justice has put into NCIC were Latinos wanted on civil 
immigration charges.109
The proposed CLEAR Act, the Department of Justice’s new “inherent authority” 
policy, and the Department’s willingness to thrust untrustworthy immigration information 
into the NCIC system illegally sent a simple message to local police.  The federal 
107
 Interview with Professor Michael Wishnie, New York University School of Law, June 12 2003 (copy on 
file with the author); see also Nina Bernstein, supra note 100. Professor Wishnie is counsel for the 
plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit challenging the practice of putting immigration information into NCIC.  
National Council of La Raza v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 6324 (E.D.N.Y.).
108
 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration 
Policy Institute, June 24, 2002 (copy on file with the author).  
109 Blurring the Lines, supra note 105, at 14 -15.
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government, particularly the Department of Justice, wants all law enforcement agencies 
arresting illegal immigrants, no matter how ill suited local police may feel for the task, 
and regardless of how little officers may know about the intricacies of immigration 
issues.  The federal government would give them authority as well as the information 
(unreliable though it might be) necessary to carry out this important task.  And the federal 
authorities announced their intention through actions that signaled unmistakably that they 
would no longer wait for agencies to volunteer under the MOU process.  Those agencies 
that did not volunteer would experience fiscal pain unless they joined the fight.   
IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S REACTION TO NEW DISCRETIONARY POWER 
TO ENFORCE IMMIGRATION LAW 
How did local law enforcement agencies react to the “offer” of new authority to 
fight illegal immigration that the Congress and the Department of Justice wished to give 
them?  Remember that all of this happened in the name of the top priority of the federal 
government: a war on terrorism in which a ruthless enemy had killed three thousand 
people in one day on our soil.  In that context, it seems inconceivable that local law 
enforcement would consider anything other than a positive response. Particularly when 
viewed against the backdrop of the constant push by law enforcement and its allies over 
decades to secure ever greater power to fight crime, it seems difficult to imagine anything 
else. After all, state and local police departments and their officers had enlisted 
enthusiastically in the war on drugs.  Indeed, state and local police and their allies formed 
the backbone of the drug war enforcement effort; law enforcement had fought hard and 
consistently for the ever-greater police authority for the anti-drug effort from the U.S. 
36
Supreme Court.110  One would expect no less enthusiasm in the newest war – the war on 
terrorism.
110
 Even a brief examination of a few of the most important U.S. Supreme Court cases involving power of 
police to stop, detain and search drivers and passengers in vehicles shows the strength and consistency of 
the drive for ever-greater police power and authority.  In Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Supreme 
Court gave police the power to use traffic enforcement as a pretext for investigating vehicles and their 
drivers for as-yet-unknown drug offenses.  Id.at 814-818.  Whren legitimized the legal basis of the ability 
of police to fight the war on drugs as they had for at least the prior ten years: stopping vehicles for traffic 
offenses as a pretext for conducting drug investigations without evidence of drug involvement.  The 
prosecution in Whren argued strongly in favor of affirming police power to use traffic enforcement as a 
pretext for drug investigation, Whren v. U.S., Brief of the United States, 1995 U.S. Briefs 5841 (March 5, 
1996), and several organizations describing themselves as champions of law enforcement’s interests filed 
amicus curiae briefs in support.  The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation asserted that a contrary ruling 
would lead to “judicial micromanagement of police departments” – a barely coded reference to the idea that 
judges should not second guess police departments and should allow officers maximum power and 
flexibility.  Whren v. U.S., Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Lexis 1995 U.S. 
Briefs 5841.  The amicus brief by the California District Attorney’s Association argued that siding with the 
defendant in Whren might force police departments to create standardized policies and regulations –
something usually seen as a positive step in law enforcement, see, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling 
Discretionby Administrative Regulations: T he Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in 
Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990), but which the Association vehemently 
opposed.  “Requiring police departments to draw up standardized policies,” Association said, “would be 
detrimental to effective law enforcement” by depriving police officers of “essential” discretion. Whren v. 
U.S., Brief of Amicus Curiae California District Attorney’s Association, Lexis 1995 U.S. Briefs 5841. In 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), the Supreme Court gave police the power to ask for consent to 
search after a vehicle stop when the procedures for the stop have been completed, without advising the 
driver that he or she is free to go.  In its amicus brief in Robinette, Americans for Effective Law 
Enforcement argued that the U.S. Supreme Court should not require police officers to tell citizens that they 
could leave the scene of a (completed) traffic enforcement action before asking for the citizen’s consent to 
search. Ohio v. Robinette, Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., Lexis 
1995 U.S. Briefs 891 (1996).  While conceding that giving such a warning constituted good police practice, 
the organization argued that the Court should nevertheless impose no limit whatsoever on this police tactic.  
Police departments and officers themselves, the amicus brief states, should decide whether or not citizens 
receive such a warning; it should not be a constitutionally mandated duty.  In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
408 (1997), the Supreme Court decided that police could order any passenger in a vehicle stopped by police 
to get out, without any evidence that the passenger had done anything wrong. A number of law 
enforcement organizations filed amicus briefs in Wilson, supporting this expansion of police power.  In one 
brief, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement was joined by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), The National Sheriffs Association, the Police Law Institute, and the National District 
Attorneys Association asserted that, for the sake of officer safety, nothing should limit an officer’s power to 
remove the passenger from the vehicle.  Maryland v. Wilson, Brief for Amicus Curiae Americans for 
Effective Law Enforcement, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, The National Sheriff’s 
Association, the Police Law Institute, and the National District Attorneys Association, Lexis 1995 U.S. 
Briefs 1268 (1996).  When a police officer conducts a traffic stop, “the officer has an absolute right to 
control both the driver and the passenger, by requiring them to either remain inside in [sic] the vehicle or 
exit and remain in the immediate vicinity during the stop.”  Id.  In its amicus brief in Wilson, the National 
Association of Police Organizations stated unequivocally that courts should always consider reasonable and 
constitutional any “police request that any occupant of a lawfully stopped motor vehicle alight during a 
routine traffic stop,” regardless of the facts or circumstances.  Maryland v. Wilson, Brief for Amicus Curiae
National Association of Police Organizations, Lexis 1995 U.S. Briefs 1268.  And in its amicus brief in 
Wilson, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argued that courts should not constrain the authority of 
officers vis-à-vis vehicle passengers in any way.  For safety’s sake, “ordering the passenger out of the car is 
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A. The Reply: “No, Thanks”
The reply of local law enforcement to Congressional and Department of Justice 
efforts to involve them surprised almost everyone involved, except police officers 
themselves.  While a few organizations representing police announced their willingness 
a reasonable tactic for maintaining control.” Maryland v. Wilson, Brief for Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation, Lexis 1995 U.S. Briefs 1268.  And in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), the first 
case surveyed here decided after September of 2001, the Supreme Court decided that police could use drug-
sniffing dogs on vehicles in the absence of any evidence raising suspicions of crime.  A joint amicus brief 
in the case from the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the Major Cities Chiefs Association used 
blunt language to argue that any limitation on the use of the drug-sniffing dogs “undercuts a valuable tool 
in the war on drugs…” Illinois v. Caballes, Brief for Amicus Curiae Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police 
and Major City Chiefs Association, Lexis 2003 U.S. Briefs 923 (2004).  They also invoked the specter of 
9/11: any restrictions on the use of police canines “threatens to undermine the government’s war on terror, 
which relies on canines to sniff vehicles and luggage for narcotics and explosives at large gatherings or at 
transportation centers such as our nation’s airports.” Id. This seems to demonstrate the correctness of 
Professor Stuntz’s idea of a “shadow” cast by 9/11 over all criminal procedure questions.  See note 2, 
supra, and accompanying text.  And an amicus brief filed in Caballes by a coalition of twenty-seven states 
argued just as forcefully that police needed the unbounded authority to use drug-sniffing dogs: “the amici 
states have an interest in ensuring that law enforcement officers are not unduly restricted in the actions they 
can take during valid traffic stops,” because police “in many of the amici States use drug-detection dogs 
during traffic stops as one method of combating the drug trade.  If the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court 
is not reversed, this valuable law enforcement tool will be severely curtailed.” Illinois v. Caballes, Brief for 
Amicus Curiae Arkansas and 27 Other States in Support of Petitioner,  Lexis 2003 U.S. Briefs 923 (2004). 
Finally, in U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), the Supreme Court gave its constitutional blessing to the 
use of so-called consensual encounters and consent searches in drug interdiction operations on interstate 
buses.  In a joint amicus brief, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, the National Sheriff’s 
Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police argued that police officers needed 
unlimited power to use consensual encounters and consent searches. U.S. v.Drayton, , Brief for Amici 
Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, National Sheriffs Association, and International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, in Support of Petitioner,  Lexis 2001 U.S. Briefs 631 (2004).   Any legal 
requirement that officers must warn defendants that they need not give consent to these procedures would 
interfere with the ability of officers to conduct these bus interdiction at their discretion – i.e., without any 
evidence of the commission of a crime – because some defendants might take the warning to heart, and 
refuse. Id. In its amicus brief, the Washington Legal Foundation stated that unlimited police power to 
engage in “consensual police questioning of citizens…[is] vital to the safety and security of all citizens.” 
U.S. v. Drayton, Brief for Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Association 
in Support of Petitioner, Lexis 2001 U.S. Briefs 631 (2004). Raising the phantom of terrorism, the brief 
stated that in the context of public surface transportation, “in the new domestic security environment, we 
can legitimately expect the criminal focus on public surface transportation to increase.” Id.  This survey of 
a small set of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases and the amicus briefs filed in those cases 
shows the clear direction of law enforcement over the last two decades.  With the objective of fighting and 
winning the war on drugs, police, prosecutors, and their allies have joined together, time and again, with 
one request for the Supreme Court: give police greater power and authority; loosen investigative 
restrictions imposed through court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.  They haven’t always won, 
see, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) holding stationary checkpoints utilizing suspicionless 
searches for drug interdiction unconstitutional), but that is not the point.  Rather, one should observe the 
great difference in the police reaction to the war on drugs, and the efforts against illegal immigration.
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to go along with these federal requests,111 most police agencies and departments 
responded to the CLEAR Act and the other initiatives with “no, thanks.”  They did not 
want a part in immigration enforcement on the local level, even if the Department of 
Justice said they had the discretion and the authority to get involved, even if the Attorney 
General and members of Congress deemed their help crucial to the nation’s success 
against terrorists, even if it would cost them funding that they could hardly spare.
Police agencies voiced several reasons for their opposition.  In some jurisdictions, 
cities had made their own policy decisions; they had already decided that local police 
would not assume any role in immigration enforcement. For example, for almost thirty 
years, the Los Angeles Police Department has operated under Special Order 40, a policy 
prohibiting officers from stopping or questioning somebody based solely on immigration 
status.112  It provides that “[u]ndocumented alien status in itself is not a matter for police 
action” and prevents Los Angeles Police Department officers from beginning “police 
action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a person,” and from arresting 
and processing anyone for “illegal entry” into the U.S.113  Former Chief Daryl Gates 
instituted the policy in “an effort to improve relations between officers and illegal
immigrants, who officials say were afraid to report crimes or cooperate as witnesses.”114
In New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg issued Executive Order 41 in 2003, which 
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prohibits disclosure of “confidential information,” including immigration information 
status, except when required by law, or in the case of immigration status information, 
when police suspect person of “engaging in illegal  activity, other than mere status as an 
undocumented alien,” or in investigations of potential terrorist activity.  Executive Order 
41 also prohibits city employees from inquiring about a person’s immigration status.115
When the late Harold Washington served as mayor of Chicago in the 1980s, he instituted 
Executive Order 85-1, which prohibited Chicago city employees, including the police, 
from cooperating with the INS on enforcement matters.116 San Diego Police Department 
spokesman David Cohen explained that his department has a strong policy against 
involvement in immigration enforcement.  “Our policy has been and continues to be that 
we are not federal immigration officers, and our department guidelines for dealing with 
undocumented persons are very strict and unlikely to change.”117  Where such policies 
exist, local government has effectively settled the question for local officials.118
For other police departments, lack of resources simply would not allow their officers 
to take on immigration responsibilities, especially in light of the overwhelming number 
115
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of new homeland security tasks they now had to undertake.119  Perhaps it is a truism that 
there is never enough money for public safety and other needs, but as discussed earlier, 
the pressures of the post-9/11 era, along with the contemporaneous collapse of the 
economy in many regions of the country, had made this problem especially acute.120 “The 
strain on local police already is enormous,” said Glenn White, a Senior Corporal in the 
Dallas Police Department and President of the Dallas Police Association, “and to ask us 
to arrest and detain immigrants is something the federal government needs to address by 
funding the INS some more and hiring additional personnel.”121
In other police departments, the refusal to get involved in immigration enforcement 
stemmed from strong beliefs about the proper responsibility of the federal government to 
secure the nation’s borders.  Without doubt, the federal government has always had the 
lead role on these issues.  The borders of the nation are, quite correctly, the concern of the 
national government.  Congress has always possessed primary authority over 
immigration policy;122 that authority comes from the Naturalization Clause of the 
Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of 
119
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Naturalization.”123  Indeed, from the point of view of our federalism-based constitutional 
system – the division of power into federal and state systems, each with discrete powers 
and responsibilities – no other arrangement makes sense.  One cannot imagine how, for 
example, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana could each have their own immigration 
policies concerning “their” borders with Canada.  California, with its strong need for 
immigrant labor for its large agribusiness sector, could not declare a more open policy on 
immigration from Mexico than the federal government mandated.  The control of the 
country’s borders has always remained a distinctly national issue – as appropriate for 
federal government control as it is inappropriate for state regulation.  Thus the 
exceedingly complex and frequently changing body of law that governs the national 
border has always been a distinctly federal matter.
Enforcement of that law has always fallen to special units of federal law enforcement 
created, trained, equipped, and deployed with the very particular mission of protecting 
the borders.  These federal immigration agencies enforce completely different bodies of 
law than state and local police departments do.  They have been trained for different 
missions; they use their authority for different purposes.  A well-trained border or 
immigration agent could easily find him or herself in trouble trying to handle a common 
911 call for a serious domestic violence incident; just the same, a very good city police 
officer might have no idea how to spot questionable immigration documents, or even 
which visa designations might allow a person to enter the U.S.  And make no mistake: 
immigration enforcement is one of the most complicated bodies of law in the United 
States.  One court has noted the “striking resemblance” between immigration law and 
“King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete,” and said that immigration law is among 
123
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“examples we have cited of Congress’s ingenuity in passing statutes certain to accelerate 
the aging process of judges.”124  Thus enforcement of immigration law under the best 
circumstances remains difficult because immigration law “is notoriously complex, 
extremely technical, and subject to frequent change.  Immigration laws have been 
compared to the tax code in their complexity,” putting local officers, untrained in the 
law’s unending nuances, at a great disadvantage.125
But another argument overshadowed police objections based on laws and policies 
already in place, on lack of resources or training, or on ideas about the federal 
government’s proper responsibility for the border.  By far, the most frequent and 
impassioned objection to involvement in immigration enforcement came from state and 
local police concerned their own effectiveness: becoming players in the enforcement of 
immigration law was bad police work, plain and simple.  Police wanted no part of 
immigration enforcement because they knew that taking on this task would undermine 
their ability to keep the public safe.  Involvement in immigration enforcement was bad 
police work from the point of view of both garden-variety crime fighting, and from the 
perspective of making the country safe from terrorists.  The reasons for this objection 
teach us much about the varied roles police play in America today.  In American cities 
and towns, the day-to-day practical experience of keeping the peace, particularly in the 
immigrant neighborhoods they patrol, has taught police officers an important lesson: 
involvement in immigration enforcement would destroy their ability meet their core law 
124 Lok v. I.N.S., 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d. Cir. 1977).
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enforcement responsibility of assuring public safety.  In other words, greater authority to 
get involved in the national struggle against terrorism by exercising power over 
immigration would not make people in the U.S. more safe – certainly not from common 
criminal predators, and not from terrorists.  Rather, using this new authority to enforce 
immigration law would actually make our people less safe.
The most important experience local police have that sets them apart from either 
federal policy makers or even federal law enforcement officers is that, in any city or town 
with an immigrant population, local police regularly put considerable time and effort into 
crime fighting in immigrant communities.  And many more officers, in a much greater 
number and variety of police departments than used to be the case end up doing police 
work among immigrant populations.  During the 1990s and into this decade, the 
settlement patterns of immigrants to the U.S. changed.  Immigrants now settle not just in 
the largest traditional “immigrant gateway” cities of the nation – New York, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, and others, which still receive much of the country’s arriving immigrant 
population126 – but in many areas that have not traditionally seen immigrant settlement.  
The largest percentage growth in immigrant populations in the U.S. between 1990 and 
2000 came in states that one would rarely think of as immigrant destinations: North 
Carolina (274 percent), Georgia (233 percent), Nevada (202 percent), Arkansas (196 
percent), Utah (171 percent) and Tennessee (169); two other unlikely immigrant 
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destination states, Nebraska (165 percent) and Kentucky (135 percent), also ranked 
among the top ten states in percentage growth in that period.127  And not all of this 
growth in immigrant populations has settled in the urban areas of these non-traditional 
states; on the contrary, many immigrants have come to suburban areas, small towns, and 
rural areas.128 The diversity of these immigrant populations also stands out, with Somali 
and Hmong immigrants in Minneapolis/St. Paul,129 Haitians in Miami,130 Cambodians in 
Lowell, Massachusetts,131 African immigrants in Seattle,132 and people from the Cape 
Verde Islands in Boston.133  Thus in just the past fifteen years, many police departments 
127
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have had considerable experience dealing with many different immigrant populations –
not just the big-city police in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, but police in every 
type and size of community in every area of the country, because so many have 
immigrant populations of their own.
Police in these communities know that their immigrant population often consists 
of a mixture of legal and illegal residents.  With illegal immigrants, the threat posed by 
police is obvious: these people fear that police, as representatives of the government, will 
either seize them for deportation, perhaps after some substantial period of incarceration, 
or report them to another agency that will do this.  Thus they naturally avoid any contact 
with police.  Legal residents may not have to worry about their own deportation, but 
many may feel apprehensive nonetheless, thinking that contact with police will lead law 
enforcement to family, friends, or acquaintances who have significant immigration 
difficulties – especially family.  In 2005, the Pew Hispanic Center reported that 13.9 
million people in the U.S. live in families in which the head of the household or a spouse 
is an illegal immigrant.  Of those 13.9 million, 3.2 million hold American citizenship.134
Even though these American citizens may have nothing to fear themselves, they may 
have strong concerns about the other members of the household – perhaps their own 
parents.135  This goes some way toward explaining why many of those in immigrant 
communities, not just those in the U.S. illegally, would want to avoid contact with 
authorities if they thought that this might have immigration consequences.
134
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Additionally, some immigrants, legal and illegal, may have come from countries 
in which figures of authority, particularly the police, have regularly been brazenly corrupt 
and horrifyingly brutal.  Imagine, for example, coming to the U.S. as an immigrant from 
Cambodia, where the country’s ruling party murdered more than a million Cambodians.  
Among such people, it would not seem unreasonable at all to find fear of police.   Chief 
Ray Samuels of the Newark (California) Police Department understands this problem.  
“We deal with immigrants from all over the world,” he says, “many who [sic] are steeped 
in beliefs and practices that alienate them from law enforcement.”136  Working with 
people with lots of past experience that causes them to fear the police makes the always-
challenging task of securing public safety even more difficult than it might otherwise be.
Thus for local police, immigrants’ fear of contact with law enforcement emerges 
as a major obstacle in the constant fight to make the streets safe.  If legal or illegal 
immigrants in these communities fear the police, whether for good reasons or bad, they 
will avoid the police in every way possible, going out of their way to steer clear of 
officers.  Among police officers, this is not a secret.  Most have experienced it and they 
know it to be a wide-spread phenomenon that constantly hinders their effectiveness.137
When immigrants fear the police enough to make efforts to avoid them, many fewer of 
them will report crimes, whether they are victims or witnesses, than would be the case 
136
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were they not afraid of the police.  “It’s very difficult in the immigration [sic] 
communities to get information from folks,” says Hans Marticiuc, President of the 
Houston Police Officers Union, “and if there’s a fear of being reported…because of 
illegal status, that just makes our job that much more difficult and it makes the city have 
that much more criminal activity.”138
Unfortunately, the police are not the only ones who know that fearful immigrants 
will hesitate to report crimes they witness or even their own victimization; criminal 
predators know it, too, and take advantage.  Lt. Armando Mayoya of the San Joaquin 
County (California) Sheriff’s Office puts it bluntly.  “If police officers start [conducting 
immigration enforcement], [c]riminals soon would realize that undocumented workers 
would be unlikely to call police for fear of being deported, and [the criminals would] 
target them for attacks.”139 This goes even for the most serious offenses.  For example, 
officers know that women who fear police are far less likely to call 911 when they have 
been raped.  “It’s a matter of practical policing,” says Los Angeles Police Department 
Assistant Chief George Gascon.  “If an undocumented woman is raped and doesn’t report 
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it, the suspect who raped that woman, remember, could be the suspect who rapes 
someone else’s sister, mother, or wife later.”140 According to an American Bar 
Association report, local police involvement in immigration enforcement and consequent 
fear of police would also have a drastic impact on victims of domestic violence.141
When fear of police makes pickings so easy, crime and criminals can saturate a 
neighborhood, making it unsafe not just for illegal immigrants, but for anyone who lives, 
works, or walks there.  
Fear of police therefore plays an important role in determining how much local 
police can do to make communities with immigrant populations safe.  Accordingly, many 
police departments have done the smart thing in these communities: police have actively 
courted immigrants to try to win their cooperation, sought contact with their leaders, 
looked for ways to build bridges and enhance opportunities for communication – all for 
the purpose of carrying one message: we, the local police, are not part of the immigration 
enforcement apparatus, and we are not interested in your immigration status.  Assistant 
Chief Rudy Landeros of the Austin (Texas) Police Department, who has spearheaded his 
department’s successful efforts to reduce crime in immigrant communities by working 
with immigrants regardless of their legal status, makes an effort to be as clear as possible 
when he addresses these issues.  As he said on a local television broadcast, “our officers 
will not, and let me stress this because it is very important, our officers will not stop, 
detain, or arrest anybody solely based on their immigration status.  Period.”142   In other 
words, police are interested in one thing: the safety of every human being in the city, 
140
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regardless of status.  As Garland (Texas) Police Officer Steve Dye told the Dallas 
Morning News, “even if they’re here illegally, they still have [human] rights.  They 
should call the police and report [crimes].  They are residents.  We serve them like all 
other residents.”143  In all, local police have learned something that federal officials who 
want local involvement in immigration enforcement seem not to realize:  success or 
failure at assuring public safety in towns and cities that have immigrant populations 
depends on local police departments having no active involvement in immigration 
enforcement, and on the community’s clear understanding that they have no such role.  
Thus, many local police departments around the country have actually done 
everything possible to avoid involving themselves in immigration enforcement efforts, 
but rather to distance themselves from it.  For example, Assistant Chief Landeros of the 
Austin, Texas Police Department, says that several years ago, Austin found itself with a 
burgeoning rate of violent crimes against immigrants.144  Landeros and his officers found 
themselves especially shocked by a string of armed robberies that turned into violent 
murders when predators attempted to steal the large amounts of cash that male victims –
all illegal immigrants – carried with them, because they could not open American bank 
accounts without acceptable identification.145  The police in Austin built partnerships 
with numerous immigrant groups in the community, formulated a marketing campaign, 
and actively reached out to the immigrant population of their city.  The slogan: “In 
Austin, it’s different.”  The department and its allies put together four Spanish-language 
public service announcements for radio, all of which got frequent play on local Spanish 
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stations.  The message of all of this was simple: the Austin police were not interested in 
learning the immigration status of victims or witnesses; they would not do anything that 
might get someone deported.  Rather, they wanted the community’s help in getting 
criminals off the street, no questions asked.  These and other efforts made a dramatic 
difference.  After an initial spike in the crime rate due to a new wave of witness and 
victim reporting of crimes stimulated by the police department’s campaign, nearly all 
categories of criminal victimization dropped, and stayed lower.
B. Is Terrorism Different Vis-a-Vis Local Policing?
One might ask whether fighting terrorism, as opposed to garden-variety street 
crime, would move law enforcement in a different direction. Given the risk – the 
catastrophe of a successful mass-casualty attack by terrorists – would it not be better, on 
balance, for our state and local police departments to become involved in immigration 
enforcement, just in case this might head off an attack?  The answer, of course, is that 
local police already participate in the fight against terrorists, and this is as it should be.  
Indeed, if we wish to prevent as many terrorist attacks as possible, we really have no 
alternative.  According to Brian Michael Jenkins, a senior advisor at the RAND 
Corporation and a nationally-respected authority on terrorism, local law enforcement is 
actually the long-term key to the defeat of terrorism.  While the federal government must 
always protect Americans against terrorism at the border, local police will stop terrorists 
and their attacks as these tactics spread inside the U.S.  “As this thing [terrorism] 
metastasizes, cops are it.  We’re going to win this at the local level.”146
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So the question is not whether local police will participate in anti-terrorism 
efforts, but how they should do this.  And even the imperative of defeating terrorists does 
not mean that local police should involve themselves in immigration enforcement.  On 
the contrary, involvement in anti-immigration efforts would be strongly 
counterproductive.  The New York Police Department may provide the best example.  
The N.Y.P.D., of course, must protect the city that terrorists targeted with two airplanes 
on September 11, 2001; by all estimates, New York City remains in the terrorist 
crosshairs.  Thus the N.Y.P.D. has created its own anti-terrorism intelligence 
infrastructure and capabilities.  It has accomplished this in ways far more effective than 
anything achieved by any federal agency, including the FBI and the Department of 
Homeland Security.  “The N.Y.P.D. is really cutting-edge,” said Brian Michael Jenkins 
of RAND.  “They’re developing best practices here that should be emulated across the 
country.  The Feds could learn from them.”147  Yet there remains one type of enforcement
in which the N.Y.P.D. has absolutely no interest: becoming involved in immigration 
enforcement in their city.  Ray Kelly, the Commissioner of the N.Y.P.D., regularly makes 
this point publicly.  For example, on the eve of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, Muslim 
community leaders from all over New York City were invited to an annual pre-holiday 
conference at the N.Y.P.D.’s headquarters, One Police Plaza.  After an address by Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg, Kelly took the podium.  He was not coy in speaking to the city’s 
Muslim leaders about immigration.  “We want recent immigrants in particular to know 
that the Police Department is not an immigration agency,” Kelly said.148
147 Id.
148 Id. at 69.  Note that the same article quotes Donna Lieberman, Executive Director with the New York 
Civil Liberties Union, accusing the police of asking suspects under arrest routinely whether they are 
citizens, and sometimes turning the answers over to immigration authorities.  Id. at 70.  This is an important 
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The reason Kelly makes this point to the Muslim community (and no doubt to the 
many other immigrant communities in New York) dovetails perfectly with the reason that 
police in Austin, Texas, and so many other American cities do their best to distance 
themselves from immigration enforcement: fear.  Fear is the enemy of police trying to 
fight everyday crime against immigrants and others, because immigrant victims or 
witnesses fearful of police won’t come forward, making it easier for predators to remain 
undetected and to victimize others. If fear is the enemy of police as they work to fight 
garden-variety crime, it is just as much the enemy of police trying to fight terrorists.  This 
is because the prime ingredient for anti-terrorism work on any level is, and will always 
be, information.  Information is the lifeblood of all efforts to root out terrorists and to 
prevent their horrifying acts.149  Cities and nations must have anti-terror assets – trained 
officers, high-powered weapons, bomb-sniffing dogs, the latest technology.  But 
information on the threats is what puts them in a position not just to respond after of 
terrorist attacks, but to prevent them by acting beforehand.150 Without this kind of 
strategic information, all of the weapons and tactics and technology in the world cannot 
protect us.  
point that Lieberman is absolutely correct to bring to light.  But even if Lieberman is correct, this does not 
necessarily contradict Kelly’s statement.  Arrested suspects are routinely asked many questions about 
themselves, and the discovery of illegal status would sometimes be worthy of the attention of government 
authorities – for example, that a suspect had been deported once and had re-entered the country, which 
would be a felony.  What is surely more important is whether immigration status is a question asked of 
those not under arrest. 
149 See, e.g., Remarks of Vincent Cannistraro, former chief of operations and analysis, Central Intelligence 
Agency Counterterrorism Center, and former special assistant for intelligence, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 26th National Legal Conference on Immigration & Refugee Policy, Session I: National Security 
and Immigrant Rights, sponsored by the Center for Migration Studies and the Catholic Legal Immigration 
Network, Inc., Thursday, April 3, 2003, Washington, D.C. (“I’ve always said that the problem of terrorism 
is one of getting intelligence, having the information to prempt” terrorist acts before they occur.  “If you 
don’t have good intelligence, you don’t have good antiterror.”)
150 Id. (“If you’re investigating [the results of] an act of terrorism, then you’ve already failed.”)
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The threat we face today comes from extremist terrorists who are young Muslim 
men, either from or with their roots in the Middle East or South Asia.  Those who might 
carry out these attacks organize into so-called “sleeper cells,” either planted in our 
country from without or “homegrown,” waiting for a signal to go into action.  As hard as 
it may be to gather information on such small, insular groups, we must do everything 
possible to maximize the chances that we will get useful information about them.  
Certainly, the government will attempt to use infiltrators and informers, though this will 
no doubt prove extremely difficult with such groups.  Considering the ethnic, religious, 
and linguistic differences between members of the cells and law enforcement, few agents 
will have the unique characteristics and skills to pull this off. Therefore, the best –
indeed, often the only – source of information on possible terrorist cells on our soil will 
be Muslim communities themselves.  The people in these communities will know the 
language, they will know the cultural nuances, and they will know who has just moved in 
to the community.  They will know which people might have traveled to the Middle East 
lately, and who might recently, unexpectedly, have become much more religious after 
such a trip.  They will know who spouts radical opinions or advocates the use of violence 
against American or Western targets.  The information will not always be available to the 
Muslim community; witness the London bombings in July of 2005, in which no police or 
intelligence agency seems to have had any idea of what these British citizens had 
planned.151  But maintaining the opportunity for this information to pass between the 
Muslim community and the police remains crucial.  Making sure that any scrap of 
possibly helpful information can flow to the authorities at least gives them a chance to 
151
 Alan Cowell, Panels Say Britain Underrated Threat Before July Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at 
A 21 (parliamentary report finds that British counterterrorism agencies failed to understand the growing 
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prevent harm, and this absolutely requires strong alliances with our own Muslim 
communities.  Richard A. Clarke, former National Counterterrorism Coordinator for the 
National Security Council who advised both the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations, says that such alliances must be our top priority if we are to defeat 
sleeper cells of terrorists in our midst.  “In the first instance,” Clarke says, “we should 
seek the cooperation of the American Muslim community in identifying possible problem 
groups and individuals.”152
Given the situation in which we find ourselves, fear of the police in immigrant 
communities could not loom larger as an issue.  Fear does not pave the way for 
communication.  Rather, fear breaks down and destroys avenues and opportunities for 
communication between the immigrant communities and the police.  Police officers who 
work the streets everyday know this well.  They understand the old joke: if a shooting 
occurs in a neighborhood on a Saturday night, everyone knows who did it by Monday 
morning – except the police.  The unspoken implication of this tired old gag is that police 
can find out who did the crime, of course, but despite what we see on television, they will 
almost certainly not learn the shooter’s identity through high-tech forensic tests.  Instead 
they will solve the case only if people in the community will talk to them.   This explains 
the importance of having good, strong relationships with citizens in every community, 
especially immigrant communities, in which police work.  Those relationships help 
improve the public image of police, to be sure, but much more importantly, they are the 
sources of all the information that police will get about the neighborhoods in which they 
work.  This is absolutely crucial for the success of investigations targeted at preventing 
terror or apprehending terrorists.  
152
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In the immediate aftermath of the bombing in London in July of 2005, the police 
searched for the source of the attack. Despite a well-earned reputation as well prepared 
for, and on top of, terrorist threats, British police and intelligence services had seen no 
danger signs before the attack.  This was not lost on Sir Ian Blair, head of the 
investigation; he understood the importance of information in solving the crime and in 
preventing another attack, and he also understood where police would have to get that 
information.  “It is not the police and it is not the intelligence services who will defeat 
terrorism,” Blair said; “it is communities who defeat terrorism.” 153  The attack, which 
bore all the hallmarks of an al Qaeda operation, put Muslims in London and all of Britain 
in fear – fear of retribution, fear of targeting by law enforcement.  They might fear 
sharing important information with the police.  Fearful community members, Blair knew, 
might hesitate to come forward with important information.  Thus Blair appealed to them 
directly, because only communities, working with the police, could stop attacks like this.
Two excellent examples exist of how we can prevent terrorist attacks on 
American soil.  In Lackawanna, New York, federal authorities broke up what they 
claimed to be a “sleeper cell” awaiting instructions from al Qaeda.154  The members of 
the cell, all young Muslim men of Yemeni extraction who lived in Lackawanna, an 
industrial town just outside of Buffalo, pleaded guilty and are now serving substantial 
prison terms.155  The FBI stopped the Lackawanna cell not with high-technology 
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electronic wiretaps, or by infiltration of the cell by an informer.  Rather, law enforcement 
became aware of the cell’s existence only because members of the local Yemeni 
community – which has been part of Lackawanna for years – told law enforcement that 
the young men had visited training camps in the Middle East.156  Without that 
information, al Qaeda might have activated the cell, with disastrous consequences.  And 
in early 2006, in Toledo, Ohio, the federal government indicted three young Muslim men 
– two of them American citizens and the third a lawful resident – alleging that they 
constituted a terrorist cell.157  As is typical in such cases, the FBI agent in charge of the 
investigation made a public statement when the government announced the indictments, 
but in this case the agent actually took great pains to say something unusual: he went out 
of his way to single out the Muslim community for praise because of its cooperation in 
the case, specifically in the way it had brought information about the suspects to law 
enforcement. “They are the ones who deserve the most credit,” said Special Agent in 
Charge Ted Wasky of the Cleveland field office of the FBI.  “The ability to prevent 
another terrorist attack cannot be won without the support that the community gave.”158
We must view the negative reaction of American police to all of the recent efforts 
to get them involved in immigration enforcement through the lens of the successes in 
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both Lackawanna and Toledo.  American police understand that becoming assistants to 
federal agents in enforcement of immigration law will only inspire people in immigrant 
communities to fear them.  This is true whether police aim to fight regular street crime or 
terrorism.  Without the help of our communities of Muslims and Middle Easterners, 
many of whom are immigrants, police know that we have little hope of heading off 
terrorist attacks by al Qaeda-inspired cells.  Thus it is profoundly in our interest to avoid 
anything that might cause members of those communities to fear police, or to feel any 
hesitancy in coming to them with information.  And how sharp the fear in Muslim 
communities must be in the post-9/11 era -- after the government used immigration law 
after the attacks to round up and detain hundreds of immigrants, mostly Muslims, as 
terrorism suspects, with no hard evidence at all; to hold them incommunicado for long 
periods; to deny them access to lawyers; and then to deport them.  With all of this as 
background, it becomes quite easy to understand why not just Commissioner Ray Kelly 
of the New York Police Department but law enforcement officials all over the country 
want nothing to do with immigration enforcement.  Getting mixed up in it will harm their 
efforts to gather intelligence crucial to anti-terrorism work.  
Thus while law enforcement’s turning away from increased discretion may seem 
unexpected at first blush, it actually makes perfect sense.  State and local police knew, 
from their own experience, that more discretion under immigration law to be used as a 
pretext to get at another crime – possible terrorism – was just not good law enforcement 
policy.  It would make their towns and cities harder, not easier, to protect from both 
ordinary criminals and from terrorists.
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C. What Are the Anti-Terrorism Benefits From Immigration Enforcement by Local 
Police?
Given the persistence of advocates for local police involvement in immigration 
enforcement, many of them may remain unconvinced by law enforcement’s arguments 
that putting this burden on local police can only hurt efforts to attain public safety.  
Perhaps, then, the discussion should proceed from the other direction.  Proponents of 
immigration enforcement by local police should shoulder the burden of answering the 
question that their position pre-supposes: what anti-terrorism benefits would accrue if 
they had things their way?  In other words, what would we gain in terms of terrorism 
prevention if local police actively engaged in immigration enforcement?  What if police 
actively sought out, or used legal pretexts to have encounters with, those people they 
suspected of immigration violations?  Would this, in fact, make us safer from terrorists?
This is certainly the assumption of many who argue for police to enforce 
immigration laws.  Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration 
Studies, clearly believes this approach would benefit our domestic security efforts.
[K]eeping the terrorists out or apprehending them after they get in [using 
immigration enforcement] is indispensable to victory…Our enemies have 
repeatedly…insert[ed] terrorists by exploiting weaknesses in our 
immigration system…[M]any of the [9/11] hijackers, including 
Mohammed Atta and several others, were young, single, and had little 
income – precisely the kind of person likely to overstay his visa and 
become an illegal alien, and thus the kind of applicant [for entry into the 
U.S.] who should be rejected.159
This, Krikorian says, means that people with Atta’s demographic characteristics should 
be denied entry into the U.S., and, once they are here, scrutinized much more closely by 
local police on virtually any pretext or occasion.
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In the normal course of their work, police frequently encounter aliens.  For 
instance, Mohammed Atta was ticketed in Broward County, Florida, in the 
spring of 2001 for driving without a license.  But the officer had no 
mechanism to inform him that Atta had overstayed his visa during his 
prior trip to the United States.  Although not an overstayer, another 
hijacker, Ziad Samir Jarrah, was issued a speeding ticket in Maryland just 
two days before 9/11, proving that even the most effective terrorists have 
run afoul of the law before launching their attacks.160
But this line of reasoning really represents nothing more than the use of proxy 
characteristics for what should really interest us.  That is, Krikorian assumes that, if we 
focus on persons as possible terror suspects because they are young, male, Muslim 
immigrants from the Middle East or South Asia, we will be looking at the “right” people.  
This will make us safer by keeping them out, getting them out once they are already here, 
or interfering with their conduct enough that they leave on their own.  But he offers no 
evidence that this will work; his assumption appears to be that the matter is self evident, 
and requires no proof.  
This would always constitute a thin argument, but in this context it also carries 
dangers with it.  Experience with proxy characteristics like ethnicity in other law 
enforcement settings suggests that, at the very least, there exist real, concrete reasons to 
doubt that proxy-based law enforcement producers hoped-for successes.  Indeed, the 
evidence seems to show exactly the opposite: using characteristics like race or ethnicity 
depresses rates of law enforcement success.161  Moreover, using proxy characteristics will 
waste valuable law enforcement time and resources, because it will inevitably sweep 
broadly and produce an overwhelming number of false positives.  In short, Krikorian’s 
argument amounts to a brief for ethnic profiling, and would inexorably lead to exclusion 
160 Id. 
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and to harassment by accent, appearance, national origin, and the like, without any 
proven, or even likely, benefit.  This type of immigration enforcement would have done 
nothing to prevent the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001.  Mary Ryan, former head of 
the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, testified before the 9/11 
Commission that “[e]ven under the best immigration controls, most of the September 11 
terrorists would still be admitted to the United States today…because they had no 
criminal records, or known terrorist connections, and had not been identified by 
intelligence methods for special scrutiny.”162  This is because al Qaeda carefully chose its 
hijackers to avoid detection: they came from educated families, had no criminal records, 
and no known connections to terrorism.  Therefore, there would be no reason to suspect 
them; they would appear on no watch list or terrorism tip sheet.163
Beyond the lack of benefits, enforcement of immigration law by local police 
would also produce substantial damage to anti-terrorism efforts.  As discussed earlier, 
these kinds of interactions between local police and immigrants would not just offend 
many in these communities; they would produce tangible fear of police – exactly what 
police do not want or need now, as they seek to build bridges with, and get information 
from, Muslim and Middle Eastern immigrants.  Fearful people will avoid police, pure and 
simple.  And that will constitute a loss for anti- terrorism enforcement – not a gain.  The 
Migration Policy Institute puts it this way.
[T]he Justice Department’s efforts to enlist state and local law 
enforcement agencies into enforcing federal immigration law risks making 
our cities and towns more dangerous while hurting the effort to fight 
terrorism.  Such action undercuts the trust that local law enforcement 
agencies have built with immigrant communities, making immigrants less 
162
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likely to report crimes, come forward as witnesses, or provide intelligence 
information, out of fear that they or their families risk detention or 
deportation.164
V. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD 
LISTEN TO POLICE; POLICE SHOULD LISTEN TO THEMSELVES
This curious tale of psot-9/11 police power leaves us to wonder what we might do 
differently – to make ourselves safe from crime and terrorism, and to address the very 
serious problems our country faces with immigration.  Neither of these questions have 
easy answers.  But the unexpected refusal of local police to participate in immigration 
enforcement – to push away a heaping helping of increased discretion, once law 
enforcement’s favorite dish – can help us learn at least two important lessons.  One lesson 
may help the federal government improve its odds against terrorists and even give it a 
better direction in the effort to fix our immigration problems.  The other lesson is one 
that, perhaps, state and local police can teach themselves.
A. The Federal Government Must Listen to State and Local Police
This may strike some as too obvious a suggestion to make.  But the federal 
government’s track record on this subject has never been good, and in the post-9/11 era, 
it is worse than ever.  Thus it bears stating clearly: federal officials in both the executive 
and legislative branches who want state and local law enforcement to become involved in 
immigration enforcement should re-think their positions, in light of the overwhelming 
objections they have heard from local police.  It is time for the federal government to stop 
dictating and begin listening to those who actually know something about public safety –
the officers who labor in the field every day.
164
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As small a recommendation as this may seem, it is hard to be optimistic about 
whether federal officials would adopt it.  The examples we have of their actions after 
September 11 supply little reason for hope.  Take, for example, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s questioning of the five thousand “nonsuspects” who had recently come from 
countries in the Middle East or the Muslim world.165  State and local police leaders, asked 
to help the FBI and other federal agencies to help find people on the Justice Department’s 
list, condemned the program.  Benny Napoleon, then Chief of Police in Detroit, sounded 
more like the head of the ACLU than of a police department, and his comments typified 
those of many other chiefs. “We’re standing with the fundamental rights of individuals 
under the Constitution and our state constitution and our municipal law.”166  Even former 
leaders of the FBI itself derided the program, saying it was unlikely to produce any 
information more important than “the recipe to Mom’s chicken soup.”167  Still, the Justice 
Department did not listen and went ahead with the interviews, in fact extending them to 
another three thousand individuals.168  And, despite the Department of Justice’s 
insistence that the interviews proved useful,169 no evidence exists to show this.  The 
Department itself asserted the usefulness of the interviews without undertaking any 
systematic examination and analysis of either the information resulting from the 
interviews or the interview program as a whole; as of early 2003, the Department of 
Justice said it had “no specific plans” to determine whether any aspect of the exercise had 
165 See notes 56 through 59, supra, and accompanying text.
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produced anything useful.170  Thus the assertion that the interviews helped the anti-
terrorism effort seems based not on fact, but on faith.  More than half of the law 
enforcement officials involved who were interviewed by the General Accounting Office 
“expressed concerns about the quality of the questions asked and the value of the 
responses obtained” in the interviews;171 and an examination of the interviews 
themselves, drawn from tape recordings by the attorneys of interviewees, confirms that 
law enforcement officers were right to suspect that the interviews provided nothing 
useful.172  All of them consist of long strings of basic questions with obvious answers; the 
agents asking them seem convinced that the whole exercise means nothing, but that they 
must go through the motions as ordered by their Department of Justice superiors.173
Some questions – for example, “Have you ever engaged in terrorist activity of any kind?” 
– seem nothing short of ludicrous.  As one attorney who represented numerous 
interviewees said, “what kind of jackass would say yes?”174
If the federal government wants help in fighting the war on terror in our own 
country, the people with relevant experience sit not at the top of the FBI or Department of 
Justice’s policy machinery, but in the city police station.  These are the people who 
understand what it takes to solve a crime when law enforcement knows neither the crime 
itself nor the perpetrators.  If, as the 9/11 Commission and other investigative bodies have 
told us, the death and destruction of September 11, 2001, had a lot to do with a failure of 
our intelligence apparatus,175 the federal government should turn to those who understand 
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that, at least on the streets of American cities, intelligence is just a fancy way of talking 
about information.  Police officers who solve crimes and make arrests know how to 
gather information from people close to the ground; they are, after all, on the ground 
themselves.
Thankfully, there are signs that those in the FBI on the front lines – the agents in 
the field offices – do understand this.  One can see that this is so by noticing that FBI 
field offices now make a regular practice of reaching out to the community in ways that 
would have seemed unthinkable just several years ago.  These agents seem to have come 
to the realization – perhaps a little late, but they have come to it nevertheless – that they 
need the help of those who live in the Muslim communities of their cities if they want to 
have any information on what goes on among Muslims.  For example, outreach workers 
in the FBI’s Cleveland field office work with community groups of all types, including 
Muslims, on a host of issues that include ethnic and religious hate crimes.176  The office’s 
Northern Ohio Hate Crimes Working Group has had considerable contact with the city’s 
Muslim, Arab, and Asian communities since September 11, 2001, and it has become a 
centerpiece of the FBI office’s efforts to build bridges into the community so as to have 
the best possible chance to head off a terrorist attack.177  The Working Group’s meetings 
have, in the process, become a well-known forum on cross-cultural issues for the Muslim 
community and Cleveland’s law enforcement agencies.178  This gives Muslims, Arabs, 
and others a regular chance to talk to the FBI and local police on an ongoing basis; this, 
capabilities, and management throughout the federal government, but especially in foreign and domestic 
intelligence agencies).
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of course, establishes and keeps open lines of communication.179  People who live in the 
community know law enforcement has heard their concerns, since the people deliver 
them face to face, in open meetings.  The FBI agents get a chance to build or nurture 
relationships that they will need in order to have a way to get information from people 
who live in the community.  They will also have an opportunity to recruit desperately-
needed new agents from Middle Eastern and Arab cultures, as well as translators and 
other vital personnel.180  In addition, dealing directly with these communities gives agents 
and police officers an unbeatable opportunity for cultural education, a necessary 
ingredient in any effort to build relationships with people from very different cultural 
backgrounds.181  This type of knowledge is also a key to greater safety for officers and 
agents on the street; with greater knowledge of an immigrant community’s cultural norms 
and behaviors come reduced chances of the kinds of misunderstandings and confusion 
that, in the heat of a moment requiring a split-second decision, could turn deadly.
So the FBI agents on the ground seem to understand the importance of using the 
methods of local police – building relationships in order to create opportunities for the 
exchange of intelligence and the cultivation of other mutually advantageous activities.  
This is all to the good, but it is not enough.  Federal policy makers must recognize the 
reason that the FBI’s field agents and officers have begun to see the wisdom of the ways 
that local cops do things: they understand that anything that breaks the trust between 
police and immigrant communities makes everyone in the city (not just illegal 
immigrants, or even just immigrants) less safe.  The idea that local police can be a “force 
multiplier” in the fight against illegal immigration and by doing so make us safer from 
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terrorists is a dangerous illusion.  And it is an illusion that immigration opponents are 
exploiting in their hopes of introducing a stricter legal regime on the question of 
immigration generally.  Thus the federal authorities should listen to the police officers 
who spend every day trying to make America’s streets safe.  
Of course, even if leaders in the federal executive and legislative branches 
suddenly did begin to listen to state and local law enforcement and to pay attention to the 
way they do things, and even if they actually followed the state and local example, this 
would only address what they should not do: press state and local police into immigration 
enforcement.  It would not tell them how to solve the great problems of the broken 
immigration system in this country; rather, it would only tell them how not to do it.  But 
even this would make for an improvement over the way things stand now.
On the legislative front, our leaders seem to have all but tuned out the objections of 
police all over the country.  In late 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill 
– the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005182 --
that would actually go further down the wrong path of local immigration enforcement 
than the CLEAR Act had.  This bill would attempt to meet police objections to enforcing 
civil immigration matters by making virtually all immigration violations into felony 
offenses;183 in addition, it might criminalize help given to illegal immigrants by people 
like social workers, nurses and doctors, and clergy.184  The thinking appears to be that 
doing this will sweep away any objection to enforcing non-criminal immigration matters 
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– because, of course, all immigration violations will be criminal by definition.  Of course, 
this bill does nothing to meet the real issue – that immigrants who fear deportation will 
avoid the police if police are involved in immigration enforcement, resulting in increased 
crime and a weakened ability to gather intelligence on both crime and potential terrorists.  
C. The State and Local Police Should Listen to Themselves
If listening to state and local police and paying attention to their experiences is what 
the federal government should be doing, it may seem surprising to turn around and 
prescribe the same remedy to state and local police.  But it turns out that they could 
benefit immensely by learning from their own unwillingness to accept the enlarged 
discretion to enforce illegal immigration – if they will apply this lesson to some of the 
other areas of law enforcement.
The starting point here is the war on drugs, the decades-long struggle in which state 
and local police have played a leading role.  It was, after all, as part of this effort that a 
great expansion of police power took place.185  But if police ask themselves the inevitable 
question – have we won the war on drugs?  Can we win it? – they may see the reflection 
of the wisdom of their own approach to immigration enforcement.  In the immigration 
context, police could see that enforcing immigration law could only hurt them, because 
they knew what worked in their immigrant communities, and what didn’t.  The time is 
certainly ripe (if not late) for asking what works in the context of the drug war, and 
whether in fact all of the discretion that courts have granted police to fight the war has 
helped them. 
In the last few years, especially in the context of the national discussion of racial 
profiling, some members of the law enforcement camp have started to ask questions like 
185 See note 110, supra.
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this; and, in at least one instance, there is movement.  More than three decades ago, the 
U.S. Supreme Court gave police the discretion to ask drivers for permission to conduct 
searches of their vehicles.186  Officers need not trouble themselves with the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement of probable cause for a search, which would otherwise limit 
an officer’s discretion.  All the officer need do is ask the driver for permission; as long as 
the driver gives permission voluntarily, no other restraint on police power to search 
applies.187  The discretion to conduct these consent searches – for any reason or for no 
reason at all – has long been a standard tool for police engaged in drug interdiction.  But 
in the last several years, data from studies around the country has revealed some 
uncomfortable truths.  First, blacks, Latinos, and other minorities are more likely than 
whites to be subjected to consent search “requests” by police officers – in other words, 
police officers use their discretion more often when confronted with minority drivers.188
Second, the use of this discretion does not yield higher rates of recovered contraband, or 
even the same rates of contraband, discovered on whites.  In fact, the consent searches of 
minorities typically yield contraband at lower rates than comparable searches of 
whites.189  This has caused some members of the law enforcement fraternity to re-assess 
the wisdom of the (for all practical purposes, unlimited) discretion they now have to 
conduct consent searches, and to impose their own limiting standards on the use of those 
searches.  For example, Brian Mackie, the elected chief prosecutor of Washtenaw 
County, Michigan, has told all of the police officers who work in his jurisdiction that he 
186 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
187
 Id. at 248-49.
188 See generally Ilya Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry Into the 
Consensual Police-Citizen Encounter, Ph. D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1999 (copy on file with the 
author); for a sample of some of these data, see David A. Harris, supra note 161, at Chapter 4. 
189 Id.
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will not bring cases involving consent searches to court, unless the officer can articulate a 
reasonable suspicion for having asked the driver for consent.190  In effect, Mackie has 
refused law enforcement’s discretion to conduct consent searches without any legal basis, 
and replaced it with a rule requiring that officers meet a Terry v. Ohio 191standard before 
they can ask for consent.  Several police forces, including the Michigan State Police, 
utilize such a standard,192 and all police in New Jersey now operate under similar court-
made rules. 193
The example of consent searches is, thus far, a lonely one, but perhaps it shows 
that there is reason to hope.  Police and their supporters may, finally, be ready to learn a 
lesson from their own experience: more discretion does not always translate into better 
enforcement.194
VI. CONCLUSION
This article discusses an anomaly: a situation in which a great crime is done, a 
crisis of major proportions proclaimed, and a role carved out for local police entailing the 
exercise of greater power – and police refuse this new authority.  In the war on terror –
surely a real war, not a metaphorical one like the war on drugs, and one with terrible 
consequences should our efforts fail – the last thing that we would expect would be for 
190
 Id. at 158-59
191 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring reasonable suspicion based on facts and inferences that the 
officer can articulate to justify a temporary stop and a pat-down search).
192 Michigan Department of State Police Traffic Enforcement Summary, Third Quarter, 2000, cited in 
David A. Harris, supra note 161, at 157-58.
193 State v. Carty, 332 N.J. Super. 200; 753 A.2d 149 (2002).
194
 One could certainly object that the local enforcement of immigration law and the wide use of consent 
searches differ: the former may undermine community safety, but the latter does not undermine the war on 
drugs, even though it may have other deleterious effects.  I would disagree, because the negative effects of 
the overuse of consent searches may also undermine public support for police efforts in the war on drugs.  
And any loss of public support will hurt the ability of the police to successfully carry out their mission, and 
to obtain convictions from jurors who have become skeptical of police through personal experience with 
police tactics like consent searches.  
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law enforcement to say, “sorry, but no” to the power our leaders wish to confer upon 
them so that they can carry out the mission.  But that is exactly what has happened.
Our state and local law enforcement officials have not shown disloyalty by doing 
this, or a lack of caring.  They have not refused to do what we want out of 
shortsightedness, or narrow self-interest.  Rather, they have done us a favor: they have 
refused because what is being proposed will not work.  Putting the power to enforce 
immigration law in their hands, and charging them with the responsibility to carry out the 
task, is a grave blunder.  They know it, and they’ve told us so.  If we and our leaders do 
not listen to them and force this task on them anyway, our police officers will not be the 
only losers.  We will also lose, because we will be less safe from both crime and 
terrorists.
The debate over whether state and local police should enforce immigration law 
illuminates a unique moment in the history of American law enforcement over the last 
thirty years.  If we are smart, we will notice it and grasp the opportunity to do better.   
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